FireWall-1 weakness?

From: Rosner, D (BUGTRAQat_private)
Date: Mon Oct 04 1999 - 11:50:51 PDT

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    FYI - I was reading about the JavaScript protection in the FireWall-1
    product. I assume that the same malicious attack indicated in the Hotmail
    thread would pass through the FireWall-1. Do not have the facilities to
    check this from my location. I would suspect that
    "javas&#67ript:alert('JavaScript is executed')" could pass through.
    
    Thanks.
    
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Hugo.van.der.Kooijat_private [mailto:Hugo.van.der.Kooijat_private]
    > Sent: Thursday, September 30, 1999 1:58 AM
    > Subject: FireWall-1 weakness
    >
    >
    > Hi,
    >
    > At present CheckPoint has not seen any reason to see the following issue
    > as a weakness in their product. So I now report this here:
    >
    > If one takes CheckPoint FireWall-1 v4.0 SP4 (latest version) and build the
    > following rule:
    >
    > Source:		Destination:	Protocol:	Action:
    > Any		citrix-server	winframe	accept
    >
    > Where citrix-server is a simple network object and winframe the definition
    > as created by CheckPoint.
    >
    > This rules allows winframe sessions to pass but should stop other traffic
    > as it does some more packet analyses.
    >
    > A customer tried to run FTP through it and saw an accept in the log. But
    > due to the lack of a server on the other side could not establish wether
    > or not there was a leak.
    >
    > Recreating this in the lab with telnet showed the same. However putting a
    > working telnetd on port 1494 at the specific server did still not allow
    > anyone to enter the system. After initial TCP connection setup it seems
    > the firewall drops connections.
    >
    > But this will lead to two weaknesses:
    >  1. Any server defended by FireWall-1 could be subject to a DoS attack if
    >     the server should accept TCP sessions at port 1494. The server allows
    >     the initial setup and then stops forwarding.
    >
    >     (That's two dependencies but we are the people that allways assume the
    >     worst as we are the ones that try to do the worst in such case ;-)
    >
    >  2. The log only shows a succesfull start of the session but down not
    >     indicate any filtering. This leaves the operator of the firewall in
    >     the dark wether or not a session was cut off due to the missing
    >     winframe signature. So there is no indication off foul play and
    >     everyone will be assuming things are just fine.
    >
    >     (We all know that if a firewall is supposed to show dropped packets
    >     that plenty of people will never look for trouble in the sessions that
    >     are allowed.)
    >
    > I hope that this document will help people understand a oversight in the
    > logging/alerting facilities that they have to deal with in FireWall-1.
    >
    > I did not test for other types of services that have additional checks in
    > them. They may suffer the same lack of logging/alerting in case incorrect
    > sessions are blocked.
    >
    > Regards,
    > Hugo.
    >
    > --
    > Hugo van der Kooij; Oranje Nassaustraat 16; 3155 VJ  Maasland
    > hvdkooijat_private	http://home.kabelfoon.nl/~hvdkooij/
    > --------------------------------------------------------------
    > Use of any of my email addresses for unsollicited (commercial)
    >     email is a clear intrusion of my privacy and illegal!
    >
    



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