PostgreSQL RPM's permission problems

From: Lamar Owen (lamar.owenat_private)
Date: Thu Dec 02 1999 - 13:42:10 PST

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    This list is widely known for dessiminating valuable security
    information -- and for being full disclosure.
    
    So, as the maintainer of the RPM set for PostgreSQL, I am making the
    following announcement about a security vulnerability in the RPM
    installation of PostgreSQL available to any local user of the machine
    running the 'postmaster' process.
    
    This vulnerability only involves PostgreSQL connection passwords.  The
    backend process creates a flat-file copy of the pg_shadow username and
    password database called 'pg_pwd' -- due to an internal error this file
    is created mode '666'.  This in itself is not good -- but the directory
    that this file resides in is by default mode '700', so it is not in
    itself a hole (although it is being fixed for version 7.0).
    
    HOWEVER, the RPM distribution up to version 6.5.3-1 had the directory
    (/var/lib/pgsql) in a highly insecure mode '755' condition.  The latest
    RPMS (available right now at http://www.ramifordistat.net/postgres) fix
    this to mode '700'.  The quick fix is to 'chmod 700 /var/lib/pgsql'.  If
    this chmod is not done, or the new RPM not installed, any local user is
    able to read the pg_pwd file -- which contains plaintext
    username/password pairs.
    
    --
    Lamar Owen
    RPM Package Maintainer, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
    



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