Solaris sadmind Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

From: Alfred Huger (ahat_private)
Date: Fri Dec 10 1999 - 11:27:03 PST

  • Next message: Brad Powell: "Re: Solaris sadmind Buffer Overflow Vulnerability"

    Certain versions of Solaris ship with a version of sadmind which is
    vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow attack. sadmind is
    the daemon used by Solstice AdminSuite applications to perform distributed
    system administration operations such as adding users. The sadmind daemon
    is started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to invoke
    an operation is received.
    
    Under vulnerable versions of sadmind (2.6 and 7.0 have been tested), if a
    long buffer is passed to a NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE request (called via
    clnt_call()), it is possible to overwrite the stack pointer and execute
    arbitrary code.  The actual buffer in questions appears to hold the client's
    domain name.  The overflow in sadmind takes place in the amsl_verify()
    function.  Because sadmind runs as root any code launched as a result will
    run as with root privileges, therefore resulting in a root compromise.
    
    This exploit was reported to the Incidents list on December 9th,
    1999 by several parties who had been attacked and compromised with it. We
    do not have permission to post the vulnerability (SecurityFocus.com) although
    we would like to. However, given that this code has been floating around for
    quite some time, and being full disclosure advocates we decided to post as much as
    possible.
    
    The exploit has been sent to Sun and is currently under inspection. When
    it is publicly available it will be posted to Bugtraq and to the
    SecurityFocus.com Vuldb. If someone else posts this vulnerability to the
    list, we will of course allow it. I should note, that I would be *very*
    surprised if CERT/CC and Sun were not aware of this problem well before it
    was brought up on the Incidents list. Out of 2000 readers on the list, 3
    admitted to being compromised (as early as October 1999) and at least one
    had full source left behind from the intruder.
    
     The actual exploit itself was written by Cheez Whiz <
    cheezbeastat_private> June 24, 1999. Cheez has at least written or
    contributed to (including reused code) the following exploits:
    
    1. Solaris kcms Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/452
    
    2. imapd Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/130
    
    3. Solaris /usr/bin/mail -m Local Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/672
    
    4. Solaris ufsdump Local Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/680
    
    5. SCO UnixWare Xsco Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/824
    
    Currently the SecurityFocus staff are not aware of any vendor supplied
    patches for this issue. If you feel we are in error or are aware of more
    recent information, please mail us at: vuldbat_private
    
     Workaround:
    
     Unless you require sadmin (if your using the Solstice AdminSuite you do)
    we suggest you comment sadmind out from your /etc/inetd.conf entry.
    
     By default, the line in /etc/inetd.conf that starts sadmind appears as
    follows:
    
     100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind
    
     If you do require this service we suggest you block all access to it from
    external networks via filtering rulesets on your router(s) or Firewall(s).
    
    
    
    Alfred Huger
    VP of Engineering
    SecurityFocus.com
    



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