Windows NT LSA Remote Denial of Service

From: NAI Labs (seclabsat_private)
Date: Thu Dec 16 1999 - 16:03:28 PST

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    ======================================================================
    
                          Network Associates, Inc.
                            SECURITY ADVISORY
                              December 16, 1999
    
               Windows NT LSA Remote Denial of Service
    
    ======================================================================
    
    SYNOPSIS
    
    An implementation flaw in the Local Security Authority subsystem of
    Windows NT, known as the LSA, allows both local or remote attackers
    to halt the processing of security information requiring the host to
    be restarted.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    VULNERABLE HOSTS
    
    This new vulnerability affects all Windows NT 4.0 hosts including
    those with Service packs up to and including SP6a.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    DETAILS
    
    The Local Security Authority is the center of the Windows NT security
    subsystem. The LSA is a user-mode process (LSASS.EXE) used to
    maintain
    security information of a system known as the Local Security Policy.
    The Local Security Policy is stored in the registry and includes such
    information as who has permission to access the system, who is
    assigned privileges and what security auditing is performed.
    
    The majority of the security subsystem components run within the
    context of the LSASS process, including the Security Accounts Manager
    (SAM) that is responsible for maintaining the SAM database stored in
    the registry. Also the default authentication package (MSV1_0.DLL)
    that determines whether username and password match information
    stored in the SAM database.
    
    In addition other user-mode processes request services from the LSA
    such as the login process (WINLOGON.EXE) to authenticate username and
    passwords that are entered when interactive users logon and logoff.
    Also, the network logon service (SERVICES.EXE) which responds to
    network logon requests also utilizes the LSA to verify
    authentication.
    
    Disrupting the Local Security Authority halts almost all user-mode
    security authentication requiring a Windows NT host to be restarted.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    TECHNICAL DETAILS
    
    Windows NT provides the ability to open and manipulate the LSA
    through an series of APIs. To programmatically manage the Local
    Security Policy of a local or remote system a session is established
    with that system's Local Security Authority. If a session is
    successfully established an LSA Policy handle will be returned for
    usage in all subsequent API calls.
    
    One specific API LsaLookupSids() utilizes the LSA to map one or more
    SIDs of user accounts, group accounts, alias accounts or domains to
    names. Invalid arguments passed to this API are incorrectly verified
    causing the LSA process to reference invalid memory resulting in an
    application error.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    RESOLUTION
    
    Microsoft has issued a patch for this vulnerability, which can be
    obtained at the following address:
    
    x86:
    
    http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/release.asp?ReleaseID=16798
    
    Alpha:
    
    http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/release.asp?ReleaseID=16799
    
    
    Microsoft's Security Bulletin for this vulnerability can be found at:
    
    http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-057.asp
    
    
    Additional information can be found in Microsoft Knowledge Base
    article Q248185, SID Enumeration Function in LSA May Not Handle
    Argument Properly:
    
    http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q248/1/85.asp
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    CREDITS
    
    Discovery and documentation of this vulnerability was conducted
    by Anthony Osborne of the Security Labs at Network Associates.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
    ABOUT THE NETWORK ASSOCIATES SECURITY LABS
    
    The Security Labs at Network Associates hosts some of the most
    important research in computer security today. With over 30
    security advisories published in the last 2 years, the Network
    Associates security auditing teams have been responsible for the
    discovery of many of the Internet's most serious security flaws.
    This advisory represents our ongoing commitment to provide
    critical information to the security community.
    
    For more information about the Security Labs at Network
    Associates, see our website at http://www.nai.com or contact us
    at <seclabsat_private>.
    
    
    ======================================================================
    
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