Re: Vulnerabilities in Checkpoint FW-1 version 3.x and maybe 4.x

From: Markus Hofmann (markusat_private)
Date: Sat Jan 22 2000 - 02:53:24 PST

  • Next message: Vladimir Dubrovin: "Re: explanation and code for stream.c issues"

    On Fri, 21 Jan 2000, root wrote:
    
    > #1
    > The basic authentication used in Checkpoint FW-1 used for
    > inside/outbound and outside/inbound allows unlimited attempts to
    > authenticate without a timeout or disconnect between unsuccessful
    > attempts.  To make matters worse, the attempt at authentication will let
    > you know if you have the wrong username before you are allowed to enter
    > in the passsword.
    >
    > The exploit is trivial, grind away at user names until you hit one that
    > works and then grind away at passwords with the username you just found
    > until you find one that works.
    >
    > For an example of this, set authentication on the FW-1 software to
    > authenticate telnet connections.  Telent to a destination past the
    > firewall, when prompted for a username, pound away.  A script could
    > crack the authentication in a very short time.
    >
    > The workaround is to use Checkpoint's encrypted authentication program
    > "SecuRemote" and not allow clear text authentication (browser based,
    > telnet, etc.) to destinations beyond the firewall.
    
    In 4.0 this is the same (and 4.1?). another solution is to use
    one-time-passwords or generally token based passwords like SecurID (but
    the session should additional make use of securemote due to preventing
    man-in-the-middle attacks). SecuRemote alone does not prevent from
    guessing the username - it only encrypts and authenticate your session.
    With VPN-1 4.0 and SecuRemote I get an different error-message if I either
    use a wrong username or a wrong password. So you always could guess
    usernames (this is maybe only restricted to FWZ and not to IKE - I don't
    know)
    
    > #2
    > The default configuration in FW-1 allows for rlogin management of the
    > server.  The rlogin prompt is avaialable on all NICs.  Unless a rule is
    > placed in your ruleset to drop or reject all connections to the
    > firewall, the authentication problem above can be used to remotely
    > administer someone elses firewall without them knowing.
    >
    > The workaround is to include the rule.
    >
    
    Isn't this one of the implicit rules? For security I would prefer to
    disable all implicit rules (another one is to allow all outgoing packets
    originated to the firewall - or to allow all icmp-traffic)
    
    yours sincerely
    
    M. Hofmann
    
    =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
    Markus Hofmann          Phone:    +49 170 2848250
    St. Urbanusstr. 15      Fax:      +49 9371 2032
                            E-Mail:   hofmannat_private
    63927 Buergstadt        SMS-Mail: smsat_private (Only Subject)
    Germany                 PGP-Keys: look at http://www.hofmar.de
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------
             Only written with 100% recycleable electrons!
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:30:43 PDT