Re: Future of s/key (Re: S/Key & OPIE Database Vulnerability)

From: -=ArkanoiD=- (arkat_private)
Date: Mon Jan 31 2000 - 15:17:42 PST

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    nuqneH,
    
    I've seen several s/key (opie, whatever you call it) implementations
    and all of them used some combination of hostname and pseudo-random number
    as authomatically generated seed. What systems have the problem you described?
    
    I see no problem in elimination shared accounts.
    
    BTW i've seen only one OTP thingie that was ~100% shoulder-surfing protected
    without using hardware tokens that may be lost, stolen, or something..
    But - it was only useful if your communication channel is protected and no one
    can capture your screen image. It was based on selecting numbers from the
    big numbers sheet (full screen) using positions known by user.
    It was based on the assumtion that no one can memorize the whole screen of
    numbers, though. (OS/360, russian version called OC EC, interactive subsystem
    "Jessy").
    
    I was thinking about improvement that could make such a thing usable even
    if data can be sniffed, but haven't found a good solution yet.
    
    
    Somebody (maybe you, Greg A. Woods) WROTE:
    >  In fact I've seen several sites where due to configuration (and
    >  implementation?) errors this algorithmic relationship resulted in the
    >  exact same sequence of challenge/response pairs being used on all hosts
    >  for any given account (because the same secret password was used on all
    >  hosts).  Simple network sniffing or shoulder-surfing would have enabled
    >  a watchful cracker to win in very short order by simply watching the
    >  N'th login on one host and then simply finding another host where the
    >  N'th login is next replaying the phrase.
    >
    >  Auditing to ensure that all successfull logins are accounted for is of
    >  course critical with any "one-time password" scheme.  Unfortunately
    >  people will still use shared accounts (eg. root!) making such auditing
    >  very difficult and almost never done.
    >
    >  I personally will never use s/key again.
    
    
    --
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