Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities

From: Len Budney (lbudney-lists-bugtraqat_private)
Date: Thu Feb 03 2000 - 11:18:56 PST

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    Theo de Raadt <deraadtat_private> wrote:
    >
    > Crypto software which uses [/dev/random] devices should be doing
    > some kind of checking to make sure that they are getting at least
    > good entropy.
    
    /dev/random will not emit bytes below some entropy threshold. Somebody
    draining /dev/random amounts to a DOS attack; it will begin emitting at a
    snail's pace, and users of /dev/random will contend for the scarce bytes.
    
    If lower entropy is acceptable, /dev/urandom will invoke a PRNG to
    keep emitting, even when the entropy pool is depleted. The output of
    /dev/urandom passes the diehard tests reasonably well, and should be
    acceptable for most non-cryptographic applications.
    
    Of course, as Werner Koch already indicated, casual applications of
    "random numbers" should not waste the entropy pool.
    
    Len.
    
    
    --
    Bandwidth is bad for the same reason that most programs are so slow:
    programmers _guess_ where the bottlenecks are rather than _profiling_.
    				-- Dan Bernstein
    



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