Re: 'cross site scripting' defenses

From: flynngnat_private
Date: Sun Feb 06 2000 - 15:32:15 PST

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    I was thinking of ways that the vulnerabilities could be taken
    advantage of to use as examples. It seems that by following a
    few minor design rules and one minor usage rule, a lot of the
    problem can be contained until the core deficiencies in code
    can be fixed. At least in sites which require a login. I base
    these rules on the assumption that script can only be injected
    into the first page of a web application and that there is only
    a single entry point (i.e. web page) into the application. I also
    assume that a user isn't tricked into performing an entire web
    application transaction on a hostile site. Those rules are:
    
    1) Don't include anything on the login screen except fields
       for username and password. Doing this would seem to help
       insure that if script is injected, the login will fail.
    
    2) Don't return any user supplied data to the browser on a
       failed login. This is so if some script code is injected into
       the username and password fields, it won't be returned to
       the browser when the corrupted authentication information
       causes the login to fail.
    
    3) Encourage users to "logout" of a web application before browsing
       elsewhere.
    
    Am I thinking right?
    
    Gary Flynn
    Security Engineer
    James Madison University
    



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