Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks

From: HC Security (securitat_private)
Date: Tue Feb 08 2000 - 23:16:01 PST

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    > >(...) Therefore, it is a wide spread
    > >practice to use 4 or 6 digit PINs. Because of the small length of the PINs
    > >an attacker can target a particular account and try all possibilities. In
    > >order to defend against this class of attacks, banks usually lock out
    > >accounts after a certain number of unsuccessful identification attempts.
    
    I don't know what is the case in California, but I don't think I can
    emphasise heavily enough how immensely stupid it is to rely _solely_ on a 4
    (or 6) digit PIN  for full access to the bank account. How come, when there
    are so many other easy-to-implement solutions which are way better when it
    comes to security? To use the same code day after day on the same
    website...... that statistical attack is perhaps not the worst, what if
    someone snooped your traffic or logged on to your win98 computer and simply
    retrieved your PIN?
    
    Here in Norway I don't know of _any_ "virtual bank" which doesn't _at
    least_ use one-time passwords, or so-called digipasses (the user types his
    PIN on an small, personal calculator-type device which returns a 6 digit
    code to use for authentication in the virtual bank - this code expires
    after 15 min or so).
    
    > >Some banks use alphanumeric characters for authentication. An attacker can
    > >use dictionary words, instead of numbers, in this case to attack these
    > >banks.
    
    Mensch!
    
    --
    Regards,
    
    Snorre Haugnes
    HC Security
    



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