Actually, this is not an example of insecurity on a user friendly platform. The Voice Print Password is an alternate password method. The primary is the password you type in. When the voice print password is used, it uses the typed password to decrypt the keychain. Since everyone's voice is unique, there shouldn't be any worry as to security. --- Mark D. Miller Distributed Systems Team Leader, Acting DHHS, National Institutes of Health Clinical Center, Information Systems Department 10 Center Dr., Rm. 1C290 MSC 1172 Bethesda, MD 20892-1172 VOICE:301-496-4903 FAX:301-480-3843 EFAX:978-231-1278 MYTALK:888-700-9840 x4702 EMAIL:mm290bat_private WEB: <http://www.mark-miller.com/> <http://www.cc.nih.gov/> > From: Roger Fajman <RAFat_private> > Reply-To: IT Security Information <IT-SECURITYat_private> > Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 18:32:09 -0500 > To: IT-SECURITYat_private > Subject: Re: How the password could be recover using FTP Explorer's registry! > > == Forwarded Mail == > > Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 04:47:07 -0500 > From: Jeffrey Paul <sneakat_private> > Subject: Re: How the password could be recover using FTP Explorer's > registry! > To: BUGTRAQat_private > > --=----=--=======-=-=--===-=-=------==---=====--=- > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" > > > I've been thinking about this issue for a while now regarding Mac OS > 9.0.... The "Multiple Users" feature allows different people (up to > 40) to use the same machine while keeping preferences and > configuration files and such seperate. It has a feature that allows > a user to use a 'voiceprint login', that lets you speak a phrase > instead of typing in a password. It matches it to your 'voiceprint' > (created earlier using four recordings of you speaking the phrase) > and logs you in if it deems a match. > > Apple also includes a feature in Mac OS 9.0 called the 'Keychain', a > secure repository for storing passwords in applications that support > the keychain API. Examples include email clients, filesharing > clients, etc. The keychain uses 'strong' encryption (I don't have > the details handy, websearch should turn up proper information), but > here's the kicker... when you login using your voiceprint password, > it unlocks (makes passwords available for retrieval) the keychain. > Obviously, setting your keychain password to something other than the > multiple users password for the account would fix this (it prompts > for keychain password after login), but this is not the default > behavior. I am wondering how the keychain is decrypted if you login > with a voiceprint instead of a password, as it is not recieving the > key from the user, so the decryption key for the keychain would have > to be stored somewhere on the harddrive. In this case, it would be > the same as the multiple users password, so the multiple users > password must not be properly one-way'd, but simply masked or > possibly even stored in plaintext..... > > Just another example of "insecurity in the name of user friendliness", I > guess. > > > -j > > > <snip> >> Passwords _cannot_ securely be stored locally without encrypting them >> with another password that the user must enter. >> >> Even if a "good" crypto algorithm is used, the key to unlock the >> "password repository" must be stored somewhere. >> Hopefully this is in the user's brain, but since most users cry foul >> when they have to remember passwords, this usuall gets stored on the >> same insecure hard drive that the "encrypted" secrets are stored, >> all in the name of user friendliness. >> >> When the key for decrypting the password repository gets stored, >> all you need to do is go find the key and then you can go read all >> the passwords. >> >> Let me reiterate: IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO STORE COMPLETE SECRETS ON >> THE LOCAL COMPUTER IF THE LOCAL COMPUTER CANNOT BE TRUSTED. >> >> Solution: Don't write apps that store passwords on the local computer >> without using another password to encrypt them. >> >> Workaround: Disable all "remember this password for me" checkboxes >> that keep cropping up in all sorts of apps >> >> /Mike >> > > > -------------------------------------------------- > sneakat_private - 0xCD91A427 > 9907 3747 3CE9 11C5 2B1C F141 D09F 488C CD91 A427 > Note: key id 0x299450B6 is lost and inactive. > -------------------------------------------------- > Copyright 2000 Jeffrey Paul. > The information contained in this message may be > privileged and confidential and protected from > disclosure. If the reader of this message is not > the intended recipient, or an employee or agent > responsible for delivering this message to the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that > any dissemination, distribution or copying of this > communication is strictly prohibited. Thank you. > > --=----=--=======-=-=--===-=-=------==---=====--=- > Content-Type: application/pgp-signature > > -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.1 > > iQA/AwUBOLpEPNCfSIzNkaQnEQLH+wCgyAQNTfCsXMm9Mn73a+NKyfSabq0AoOMG > BAfNzlMpaBb6zKhOzPtpMVzU > =lr1a > -----END PGP MESSAGE----- > > --=----=--=======-=-=--===-=-=------==---=====--=---
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:38:14 PDT