ISS Advisory: Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in IRIX Embedded Support Partner Infrastructure

From: X-Force (xforceat_private)
Date: Tue May 15 2001 - 06:13:51 PDT

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    Internet Security Systems Security Advisory
    May 9, 2001
    
    Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in IRIX Embedded Support Partner 
    Infrastructure	
    
    Synopsis:
    
    ISS X-Force has discovered a buffer overflow in the “rpc.espd” component
    of the Embedded Support Partner (ESP) subsystem. ESP is installed and 
    enabled by default on all current SGI IRIX installations.  
    
    Impact:
    
    There is a buffer overflow in “rpc.espd” that may allow remote attackers
    to execute arbitrary commands on a vulnerable host. A local account is 
    not required to exploit this vulnerability.
    
    Affected Versions:
    
    IRIX 6.5.5 – 6.5.8
    
    Description:
    
    ESP was developed by SGI to address the concerns of many system 
    administrators who needed to manage large-scale SGI environments. ESP 
    allows administrators better access to information regarding the state 
    of all SGI devices on a network. It integrates and correlates system 
    configuration management, event management, resource management, 
    reporting, statistics generation and analysis as well as many other 
    features.
    
    ESP was first introduced in IRIX version 6.5.5. The ESP daemon, 
    rpc.espd, contains a buffer overflow condition that may allow remote 
    attackers to execute arbitrary commands with super user privileges on 
    the target server. 
    
    
    Recommendations:
    
    SGI recommends immediately disabling rpc.espd to prevent exposure before
    patches can be applied.  To disable rpc.espd:
    
    1. Become the root user on the system.
    
                    % /bin/su -
                    Password:
                    #
    
        
    2. Change the permissions on the rpc.espd daemon.
    
                    # /bin/chmod -x /usr/etc/rpc.espd
    
    3. Restart inetd to kill any vulnerable running daemons.
    
                    # /etc/killall -HUP inetd
    
    4. Return to previous level.
    
                    # exit
                    %
    
    SGI has made security patch 4123 available to address this 
    vulnerability. SGI security patches can be found at: 
    http://www.sgi.com/support/security.
    
    ISS X-Force recommends that all unused daemons or services be disabled
    to prevent exposure to both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
    
    ISS’ SAFEsuite intrusion detection system, RealSecure, and network 
    security assessment system, Internet Scanner, will have signatures 
    available for this vulnerability in upcoming X-Press Updates.
    
    Additional Information:
    
    SGI Security Advisory, “IRIX Embedded Support Partner Buffer Overflow”: 
    http://www.sgi.com/support/security/advisories.html
    SGI Services and Support website:
    http://www.sgi.com/support
    
    SGI Services and Support, Security homepage:
    http://www.sgi.com/support/security
    
    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the 
    name CAN-2001-0331 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in 
    the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for 
    security problems. 
    
    Credits:
    
    This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Mark Dowd of ISS 
    X-Force. Internet Security Systems would like to thank SGI for their 
    response and handling of this vulnerability.
    
    ______
    
    About Internet Security Systems (ISS) 
    Internet Security Systems (ISS) is a leading global provider of security
    management solutions for the Internet. By providing industry-leading
    SAFEsuite security software, remote managed security services, and 
    strategic consulting and education offerings, ISS is a trusted security 
    provider to its customers, protecting digital assets and ensuring safe 
    and uninterrupted e-business. ISS' security management solutions protect
    more than 5,500 customers worldwide including 21 of the 25 largest U.S.
    commercial banks, 10 of the largest telecommunications companies and 
    over 35 government agencies. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in 
    Atlanta, GA, with additional offices throughout North America and 
    international operations in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and
    the Middle East. For more information, visit the Internet Security 
    Systems web site at www.iss.net or call 888-901-7477.
    
    Copyright (c) 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert
    electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express 
    consent of the X-Force. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of
    this Alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please 
    e-mail xforceat_private for permission.
    
    Disclaimer
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    information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
    are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
    author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in 
    connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
    information is at the user's own risk.
    
    
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    as well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.
    
    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force
    xforceat_private of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    
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