IPC@Chip Security

From: Siberian (i.am.a@x-men.com)
Date: Thu May 24 2001 - 08:10:40 PDT

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    Sentry Research Labs
    www.sentry-labs.de.vu
    
    product: IPC@Chip (Beck GmbH)
    vendor informed: 21th of May
    status: unanswered
    
    Note: The demonstration tool and a german version (there is also an english
    download version) of this report is available form our website.
    
    Siberian
    
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    IPC@CHIP Security Report v0.2
    2001 by Sentry Research Labs
    www.sentry-labs.de.vu
    
    Vendor informed: Monday, 21th of May
    
    Pre
    
    We did a security audit on the IPC@Chip (vendor is Beck GmbH) using a DK40
    Evaluation Board. During this tests we tested the system for common security
    flaws, used common attack strategies and analysed behaivior of the IPC.
    Hopefully all bugs will be removed in further verisons of the BIOS software.
    We will keep on monitoring this product in the futur.
    
    SDL
    
    
    Warnings: 8
    Flaws: 3
    
    
    Warnings
    
    TelnetD
    
    DEFAULT passwords
    The IPC is using a TelnetD with factory set DEFAULT Passwords ("tel").
    
    Brute Force
    Because the TelnetD isn't using a random delay on it's login attemps and it
    isn't counting or logging any bad passwords, it's possible to brute force
    the password in no time. A demonstration tool is available on our website.
    
    Lock up
    Only one user may use the TelnetD at once and there isn't any timout set by
    default. So it's possible to lock access fot the real admin. Just connect to
    the IPC and leave a telnet window open and untouched.
    
    User Guess Attack
    By analysing the return value given by the TelnetD on login it's possible to
    find existing user accounts. A demonstration tool is available on our
    webpage.
    
     "User unknow" = non existing user
    "Password:" = existing account
    
    
    Webserver
    
    CHIP.INI
    The webserver root directory is set to / by default. A attacker may download
    the chip.ini file, containing all logins and paswords by typing i.e
    http://ipcchipip/chip.ini.
    
    Long Requests
    If a real long request is send the server stops responsing, but the a few
    moments later everything is well again. All requests send during the
    downtime are lost.
    
    
    FTPD
    
    DEFAULT passwords
    The IPC is using a FTPD with factory set DEFAULT Passwords ("anonymous" or
    "ftp"), both a full access accounts.
    
    TCP/IP
    
    Sockets
    By SYN flooding or mass request HTTP files the IPC may be blocked for some
    time. There is a max. of  only 64 sockets,so a lame DoS aatck is really
    esay.
    
    Flaws
    
    ChipCfg
    
    This CGI Scipt is installed by deafult and can't be removed. It revals
    network data to anyone, also possible attackers.
    
    Typ i.e http://ipcchipip/ChipCfg.
    
    Workaround: -
    
    FTPD
    
    By adding just one user to the system, the DEFAULT accounts are not disabled
    completly, "anonymous" still works and grands full access.
    
    Workaround: Add a second user.
    
    TelnetD
    
    By adding just one user to the system, the DEFAULT accounts are not
    disabled, "tel" still works and grands full access.
    
    Workaround: Add a second user.
    



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