Locally exploitable races in OpenBSD VFS

From: Alexander Viro (viroat_private)
Date: Sat Jun 02 2001 - 16:00:08 PDT

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    [my apologies if it ends up submitted twice]
    Let's start with the trivial: good old aliasing bugs.
    
    Example 1:
    dup2() vs. close(). Relevant file: kern/kern_descrip.c
    
    sys_dup2(p, v, retval)
            struct proc *p;
            void *v;
            register_t *retval;
    {
    [snip]
            if ((u_int)old >= fdp->fd_nfiles || fdp->fd_ofiles[old] == NULL ||
                (u_int)new >= p->p_rlimit[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur ||
                (u_int)new >= maxfiles)
                    return (EBADF);
    OK, we've checked (among other things) that old is indeed opened.
    [snip]
            if (new >= fdp->fd_nfiles) {
    We either expand a descriptor table
    [snip]
            } else {
    Or reuse existing descriptor, closing file if it's opened.
                    (void) fdrelease(p, new);
    Which is the blocking operation, BTW.
            }
            return (finishdup(fdp, old, new, retval));
    }
    [snip]
    finishdup(fdp, old, new, retval)
            register struct filedesc *fdp;
            register int old, new;
            register_t *retval;
    {
            register struct file *fp;
    
            fp = fdp->fd_ofiles[old];
    Got the struct sile of the file we are trying to dup...
            if (fp->f_count == LONG_MAX-2)
    ... and dereference it. We had checked that it's non-NULL, right?
    
    Wrong. Another thread might be sharing our descriptor table (man rfork).
    IOW, fdp points to shared data structure. So we had done the equivalent of
    
    	if (global_var) {
    		blocking_call();
    		if (global_var->f_count)
    			...
    	}
    
    Sloppy? Yes, and way beyond that. We have a nice shiny race between
    dup2(0,1); and close(0). And it's a wide one. Turning that into
    full-blown exploit is left as an exercise for readers.
    
    Example 2:
    pipe() vs. close() (kern/sys_pipe.c)
    
    sys_opipe(p, v, retval)
    [snip]
            error = falloc(p, &rf, &fd);
            if (error)
                    goto free2;
    [snip]
            retval[0] = fd;
    
            error = falloc(p, &wf, &fd);
            if (error)
                    goto free3;
    [snip]
            return (0);
    free3:
            ffree(rf);
            fdremove(fdp, retval[0]);
    free2:
    [snip]
    
    	Think what happens if the second allocation fails.  It is a
    blocking call. During that time another thread had a nice possibility
    to call close(retval[0]); since that value is very easy to predict -
    it's the first available file descriptor. close() would
    	* remove pointer from fdp[retval[0]]
    	* call ffree() on it.
    Now, we come back and do _another_ ffree() on the poor beast. Welcome to
    kernel panic...
    
    	Code is equivalent to
    
    	global_var = p = alloc_foo();
    	blocking_call();
    	release_foo(p);
    	global_var = NULL;
    
    It's not just sloppy. It's obviously broken - obviously for anyone with
    half of clue.
    
    I can easily provide more examples of the same crap and so can anyone
    who would bother to RTFS the descriptor handling in kern/*. Apparently
    that had never happened during the last 5 years or so.
    
    I'm not talking about the bugs that would require anything nontrivial to
    find and understand. Just follow the yello^Wpiles of sloppy C and nearly
    every one will turn out to be exploitable. And no, it's not limited to
    descriptor handling - same goes for sys_pipe.c, etc.
    
    Theo had been informed about that crap. Couple of weeks ago. Finding and
    fixing these bugs is a simple matter of grep. So far it hadn't been done.
    I've proposed to help with that, but apparently it got no interest. <shrug> 
    Very well, there are other piles of garbage in need of fixing and seeing
    crappy code in obscure Linux drivers is less disturbing than that in core
    kernel.
    
    Frankly. my respect to Theo went way down. This code had never been read
    through, let alone audited. And that's the core kernel. Moreover, the
    same bugs had been fixed in FreeBSD half a year ago. In other words, just
    keeping an eye on other *BSD trees would be enough to catch them. Same
    for lurking on freebsd-hackers. Same for watching the Linux tree, where
    an audit of relevant areas had been done nearly two years ago. Done and
    discussed on linux-kernel. Sad...
    
    #include <stdrants/people_dont_bother_to_RTFS.h>
    
    -- 
    "You're one of those condescending Unix computer users!"
    "Here's a nickel, kid.  Get yourself a better computer" - Dilbert.
    



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