Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability

From: sarnoldat_private
Date: Wed Jun 27 2001 - 17:12:47 PDT

  • Next message: QuantumG: "Mozilla is excessively generous."

    On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 11:08:04AM +0200, Joachim Blaabjerg wrote:
    > > Appending to /etc/passwd has nothing to do with pam.
    > 
    > No, not directly, but if your `su` uses PAM to authenticate users and PAM
    > reacts to the spaces in the beginning of the passwd file, it surely has
    > something to do with PAM. To check whether `su` uses PAM or not, try "ldd
    > `which su`|grep libpam"
    
    The fun thing, of course, is that it doesn't matter about the specifics
    of how 'su' reacts when presented with this situation. This just
    happened to be a very simple and provocative exploit. The attacked
    target doesn't have to be /etc/passwd. This exploit could be re-written
    trivially to use other files -- think 'cron', /root/.bash_profile,
    /etc/bashrc, /etc/Muttrc, etc. All with at least one, probably more,
    lines under control of an attacker.
    
    Regardless of how anyone's 'su' reacts, upgrading samba to a fixed
    version is very important.
    
    Seth Arnold
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jun 28 2001 - 13:50:07 PDT