Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

From: Crist Clark (crist.clarkat_private)
Date: Tue Jul 17 2001 - 17:20:36 PDT

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    Guess we were all having too much fun at Black Hat/DEFCON.
    
    -------- Original Message --------
    Subject: Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?
    Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2001 20:29:41 -0600
    From: aleph1at_private
    To: Crist Clark <crist.clarkat_private>
    References: <200107092228.IAA26460at_private> <3B4AFF8D.5D6A0A89at_private> <3B4B3F9F.47ABD9C6at_private>
    
    It appears I this message felt through the cracks. Please, feel free to
    post it again.
    
    * Crist Clark (crist.clarkat_private) [010710 11:47]:
    > John Kristoff wrote:
    > > Darren Reed wrote:
    > > > Silly window sizes aren't so bad.  If you have a window size of one then
    > > > you only ever have one outstanding piece of data sent at a time.  So if
    > > > I have 16k of data, it might take 32k or more packets, but I can only send
    > > > one packet at a time.
    > > 
    > > With a window size of 1, a misbehaving receiver might be able to
    > > anticipate packets injected into the network by the sender.  The
    > > receiver could aggressively generate ACKs before data is actually
    > > received (bypassing typical delayed ACK mechanisms).  This may be more
    > > of a problem for the sender if the rate of 1-byte ACKs is high.  If the
    > > connection and receiver's address could be spoofed, bursts of 1-byte
    > > segments from the sender can be sent to an innocent victim as part of a
    > > tinygram DoS attack.
    > 
    > OK, now we are getting away from MSS issues and moving completely into
    > "Daytona" TCP attacks. Daytona attacks are independent of any real or
    > imagined MSS issues, but it is possible that toying with the MSS could
    > amplify the effects of a Daytona attack.
    > 
    >   http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/savage/papers/CCR99.pdf
    > 
    > -- 
    > Crist J. Clark                                Network Security Engineer
    > crist.clarkat_private                    Globalstar, L.P.
    > (408) 933-4387                                FAX: (408) 933-4926
    > 
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    SecurityFocus.com
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