REPOST: A damaging local DoS in WinNT SP6a

From: hypoclear (hypoclearat_private)
Date: Fri Aug 03 2001 - 11:29:20 PDT

  • Next message: Andreas Marx: "Re: SECURITY.NNOV: special devices access in multiple archivers"

    Before reading below, note that this is only 
    possbile with write access to the winnt/system32 
    directory.  As many have told me already today 
    that if that dir is open to read access there are 
    many more problems...  I have found that in many 
    corporate/school/etc. networks which run WinNT, 
    leave the system32 directory open.  Maybe the 
    issue really isn't what I have presented, however 
    I thought this particular vulnerability was fixed 
    after SP4.  Now apparantly instead of allowing 
    anyone access to the system, it trashes it.  The 
    program NT4ALL has been available for a few 
    years...
    
    I'm only bringing this to light, because I think 
    it could pose as a threat to many networks which 
    run NT.  If anyone disagrees then just disregard.
    
    
    The attached advisory can also be found at:
    http://hypoclear.cjb.net/hypo_nt_dos.txt
    
    
    ---
    
    	[[:hypoclear security advisory:]]
    
    
    Vendor   :  Microsoft | http://www.microsoft.com
    Product  :  Windows NT SP6a (and lower?)
    Category :  Local DoS
    Date     :  08-03-01
    
    
    CONTENTS
    1. Overview
    2. Details
    3. Exploit
    4. Possible Solution
    5. Vendor Response
    6. Credits
    7. Contact
    8. Disclaimer
    
    
    1. Overview:
    
    WindowsNT SP6a is subject to a local Denial of 
    Service (DoS) attack, upon running "NT4ALL".
    This particular vulnerability has the potential to 
    permanently damage the workstation/server,
    because no users are able to "log on" to the 
    computer after NT4ALL is run.
    
    
    
    2. Details:
    
    NT4ALL is a program written by 9 
    (nine1001at_private) and was originaly an exploit 
    against
    WindowsNT SP4.  It's goal is to "Let all the users 
    logon into the NT machine with any password 
    they type from the local NT machine or from other 
    computers in the same domain."  It has been
    available publically for a few years.
    
    When running NT4ALL the user (with write access to 
    /winnt/system32) can either put the computer,
    into NT4ALL's "SPECIAL" or "NORMAL" mode.  Putting 
    a WindowsNT machine running SP6a into SPECIAL
    mode and rebooting, causes the machine to not 
    allow anyone (including Adminisrators)
    access to the computer.
    
    No login's are allowed because the NT system 
    service "lsass.exe" crashes everytime the machine 
    is
    rebooted and the login window pops-up.
    
    After attempting to repair the computer with the 
    WindowsNT cd-rom the machine would allow logins,
    however the machine ran EXTREMELY slow.  All 
    available CPU ticks were being consumed by 
    "SERVICES.EXE" and "lsass.exe".
    
    NOTE: ***If testing this vulnerability it is 
    highly recommended that you backup all your data 
    or 
    test on an unused machine.  In all my tests after 
    running NT4ALL the computer will be virtually 
    useless!***
    
    This vulnerability has the potential to be very 
    harmful, because NT4ALL can run quite invisibly,
    and if the payload is attached to a 
    self-replicating email (like many macro virus's), 
    it could
    render a mass of workstations useless.
    
    Here are links to download NT4ALL from Packet 
    Storm Security:
    Newer version of NT4ALL:
    http://packetstormsecurity.org/NT/hack/nt4all-101.
    zip
    
    Original version of NT4ALL:
    http://packetstormsecurity.org/NT/hack/nt4all.zip
    
    (All tests were done with the original version of 
    NT4ALL)
    
    
    
    3. Exploit
    
    Run NT4ALL once (should put the machine in SPECIAL 
    mode).  
    Note: You can run NT4ALL with the /t option to 
    verify that SPECIAL mode is on.
    Reboot.
    The computer will no longer allow ANYONE 
    (including administrators) to log in.
    The problem does not seem to be reversed no matter 
    how many reboots are attempted.
    
    If attempting to repair the OS with the Windows NT 
    cdrom, the computer will allow for
    logins, but run VERY slow.  (All CPU ticks are 
    taken by SERVICES.EXE and lsass.exe).
    
    
    
    4. Possible Solution
    
    Disable write access to the winnt/system32/ 
    directory for all users except the Adminsitrator,
    until a vendor solution is provided.
    
    
    
    5. Vendor Response
    
    07-19-01: Problem sent to the Microsoft Security 
    Response Center (MSRC), securityat_private
              They respond to the problem within a few 
    hours.
    
    07-23-01: After a few days of communication with 
    MSRC they suggest I sent the problem to Microsoft
              Product Support Services (MPSS) because 
    it is more of a stability issue.
              I sent the issue to MPSS via the URL 
    http://support.microsoft.com/directory/feedback/en
    try.asp,
              as suggested by MSRC.
    
    07-30-01: After no response from MPSS I resend the 
    problem and state that I planed to release an 
    advisory
              on the problem within the next few days.
    
    08-03-01: No response has been recieved from MPSS, 
    so this advisory is being released.
    
    An attempt has also been made to contact 9 about 
    the NT4ALL program, after my original discovery, 
    but 
    he (she?) did not respond.
    
    
    
    
    6. Credits
    
    Actual credit here goes to 9, because he (she?) 
    wrote the NT4ALL program.  All I did was be stupid 
    enough
    to run it and screw up one of my systems ;-)
    
    
    
    7. Contact
    
    Advisory written by hypoclear.
    email     : hypoclearat_private
    home page : http://hypoclear.cjb.net
    
    
    
    8. Disclaimer
    
    This advisory remains the property of hypoclear.
    This advisory can be freely distributed in any 
    form.  
    If this advisory is distributed it must remain in 
    its entirety.
    Hypoclear is not responsible of any use/misuse of 
    this advisory.
    
    This and all of hypoclear's releases fall under 
    his disclaimer, 
    which can be found at: 
    http://hypoclear.cjb.net/hypodisclaim.txt
    



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