Hi Resolution System Ltd's MacAdministrator 2.0.4fc4 Hidden Files Disclosure and Access Vulnerability

From: MD5 (mithrandirat_private)
Date: Wed Aug 08 2001 - 23:41:18 PDT

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    Type: Local
    
    Class: Environment/Access Validation Error
    
    Vulnerable:
            MacOS 8.6/MacAdministrator(tm) 2.0.4fc4
    
    MacAdministrator 2.0 is a powerful management tool
    for computers running MacOS(tm).  It provides an
    extensive range of features, under administrator
    control, for large and small networks independent
    of server type.
    
    Discussion:
    
    MacAdmin 2.0 provides the utilization of the
    hidden file attribute on the HFS catalog system
    providing a way of maintaining and administrating
    a network of multiple users.  It also provides the
    administrator with an override account on each
    node connected to MacAdmin's virtual network. 
    MacAdmin also secures the Navigation
    services/Standard File Manager APIs in the MacOS
    development toolbox, for accessing certain
    features(eg.making sure hidden files don't show
    up, access locking).  Such features are noteable
    on most programs try to access the filesystem
    catalog.
    
    The problem comes in however, when certain
    programs at compile time are linked against an
    older version of the macintosh toolkit or other
    customly crafted routines, they sometimes neglect
    newer features of the system eg. hidden file
    flags, which leads to the disclosure of hidden
    files.
    
    This in itself provides a theoretical problem, as
    users could venture into hidden folders and expose
    hidden filenames, possibly sensitive information,
    which could compromise the privacy of other users
    or the system.Furthermore, users are also able to
    access and even open/read such unprotected hidden
    files on the system, increasing the likelihood of
    the user to view private information and sensitive
    system information.
    
    Indeed this is what can be achieved with
    MacAdmin's preference files, resident on every
    computer node in its virtual network(distribution
    design feature).  This allows for malicious users
    the possibility to disclose settings, manipulate
    vital configurations of the MacAdmin system(as
    files do not appear to be read-only), and even
    gain access to the override account name and
    encrypted password, which would effectively
    compromise all override accounts on connected
    nodes if the user in turn compromised the
    password.
    
    Part of the problem is that MacAdmin relies on
    using hidden files to try secure a few
    sensitive/private files such as original
    extensions, control panels, prefs, and user
    folders of other users(user folders are however
    also coupled with access locking preventing
    exposure of docs, but does give indication of what
    login names are available).  This only makes the
    environment more obscure, but leaves it vulnerable
    to attack when exposed.
    
    
    Exploit:
    
    Proof of this concept can be presented by
    compiling the example program "HexDump" (user
    account required) provided by the Think Pascal(tm)
    4.0 program package and then using it to browse
    through the filesystem hierachy.  Because Think
    Pascal provides its own runtime library with
    custom routines and toolbox(released from some OLD
    MacOS release)it neglects to handle hidden files
    properly.  The HexDump program uses the GetFile()
    procedure to list and open files(it is a toolbox
    trap for the Navigation Services/Standard File
    Manager API set itself provided), which allows a
    user to explore through the system detecting
    hidden files and opening them for viewing (unless
    prevented by the access permission locking on
    files/dirs).
    
    The likelihood is that this fault is not limited
    to MacAdmin 2.0.4fc4
    
    Suggested Solution:
    
    The long and strenuous solution is for Hi
    Resolution Systems to make MacAdmin secure system 
    routines by restriction of some sort and mandatory
    locking of configuration files(admins do not
    appear to be able to do so by configuration
    currently).
    
    Current administrators are advised to tighten
    configurations a lot more by allowing a certain
    set of applications execution priveleges only so
    rogue programs cannot be run which may pose a
    security risk and perhaps update older
    applications in favour of newer releases that have
    been compiled against a newer Mac Toolbox.  Hiding
    files should also not be relied on for protecting
    sensitive information.
    



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