Security problems with Dell Latitude C800 Notebook BIOSes

From: Bernhard Rosenkraenzer (beroat_private)
Date: Tue Aug 14 2001 - 08:28:36 PDT

  • Next message: Raymond M. Reskusich: "Re: Security problems with Dell Latitude C800 Notebook BIOSes"

    Originally reported to Dell support on May 02, 2001.
    After not getting a reply, sent to a Dell Employee with a request to pass
     it on to the correct people on May 04, 2001.
    Waited 3 BIOS revisions, this problem has still not been addressed, so
     I'm warning the public about it.
    
    There's a major problem with the Latitude C800 BIOS, originally
    noted in revision A09, still present in A13 and probably all prior
    releases:
    
    When using suspend to disk, the Latitude BIOS dumps the system status to
    the suspend to disk partition and prepends an OS loader code, and toggles
    the active bit on the suspend to disk partition.
    
    If DOS or a sufficiently similar system is installed, the master boot
    record will boot anything that has the active bit - such as the suspend to
    disk partition when it's there; so it'll restore the session as expected.
    
    This is VERY dangerous though - it allows things like suspending a
    session, then booting the normal OS (or something else from a floppy or
    CD-ROM - the BIOS does nothing to ensure the stored session is actually
    recovered), doing something completely different including modifying disk
    content, reading all content (passwords and confidential data) from the
    suspend-to-disk partition), then restoring the session that was
    suspended before. The result of this can be anything and will almost
    certainly lead to data loss.
    
    Assume the following situation: The BIOS is set up to boot from floppy
    disks first. The user locks the screen and puts the notebook in suspend to
    disk mode.
    With a normal BIOS, his data is safe - it will restore the session the
    next time the computer is turned on.
    With the C800 BIOS, a cracker inserts a boot floppy, turns the
    notebook on -- and can edit the saved session, reading everything that
    was in memory (passwords, sensitive data), and modify it.
    Furthermore, if the computer isn't running off encrypted partitions,
    the cracker has full access to the owner's files, and can mess
    them up. He removes the floppy, the owner turns the notebook back on, his
    session is restored, but the rest of the system is no longer in the same
    state --> pending disk accesses will return garbage and mess up the
    system, possibly beyond repair.
    
    Furthermore, while not relevant to security, this behavior prevents
    suspend to disk from working correctly with boot loaders that don't use
    the active flag, such as LILO or grub.
    
    Workaround:
    - Don't use suspend-to-disk even if it happens to work with your OS, use
      encrypted partitions if supported by the OS
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Aug 14 2001 - 11:10:44 PDT