-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Cisco Security Advisory: CBOS Web-based Configuration Utility Vulnerability ====================================================================== Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2001 August 23 20:00 (UTC -800) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Summary ======= Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified and fixed in the Cisco Broadband Operating System (CBOS), an operating system for the Cisco 600 family of routers. Any router in the Cisco 600 series family can be made unresponsive by a large amount of HTTP traffic accessing the web-based configuration utility on the router; additionally the web-based configuration utility is enabled by default. This is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCdv06084, CSCdv06088, CSCdv06089, and CSCdv06098. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-cbos-webserver-pub.shtml. Affected Products ================= The affected models are: 627, 633, 673, 675, 675E, 677, 677i and 678. These models are vulnerable if they run any of the following, or earlier, CBOS releases: 2.0.1, 2.1.0, 2.1.0a, 2.2.0, 2.2.1, 2.2.1a, 2.3, 2.3.2, 2.3.5, 2.3.7, 2.3.8, 2.3.9, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.2ap. No other releases of CBOS software are affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are affected by this vulnerability. These defects will be fixed in the following CBOS releases: 2.4.2b and 2.4.3. Details ======= CSCdv06084 When the Cisco 600 series router is accessed via telnet via multiple connections, the router will fail to pass traffic, and may become unresponsive to configuration attempts, requiring a reboot to recover to normal operation. CSCdv06088 When the Cisco 600 series router is accessed via HTTP via multiple connections, the router will fail to pass traffic, and may become unresponsive to configuration attempts, requiring a reboot to recover to normal operation. CSCdv06089 The web-based configuration utility in Cisco Broadband Operating System (CBOS) binds itself to a TCP port (port 80 unless configured for another port) even when web-based configuration services are disabled. This leaves the Cisco 600 series router vulnerable to CSCdv06088 even when the affected service is apparently disabled. CSCdv06098 The web-based utility is now disabled by default, allowing customers to choose to enable this configuration option. Impact ====== The combination of each of these issues causes the Cisco 600 series router to be vulnerable to a Denial-of-service attack. None of these defects results in a failure of confidentiality of information stored on the unit. None of these defects allow hostile code to be loaded onto the Cisco 600 series router. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== The following table summarizes the CBOS software releases affected by the vulnerabilities described in this notice and scheduled dates on which the earliest corresponding fixed releases will be available. +=======================================================================+ | Major | Description | Availability of Repaired Releases | | Release | or Platform | | +=======================================================================+ | | | General Availability (GA) | +=======================================================================+ | All releases | All platforms | 2.4.3 | | | | 2001-AUG-23 | +=======================================================================+ Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco is providing software patches and upgrades to supported products to remedy the vulnerability for all affected Cisco customers. Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for upgrade assistance and instructions. For most Cisco customers, upgrades are available through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com/. Customers without contracts can obtain the software by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows: * (800) 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * E-mail: tacat_private See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirtat_private" or "security-alertat_private" for software upgrades. Workarounds =========== There is no specific workaround for each of these vulnerabilities; however, a workaround exists which has proven a reasonable defense for the CodeRed Worm attack. It is advisable to disable web management on port 80, by setting the web management port to some number greater than 1024, with the following command, replacing the text "number_greater-than_1024" with an actual number. set web port number_greater-than_1024 Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== This issue is being exploited actively and has been discussed in numerous public announcements and messages. The most common occurrence of exploitation has been via the spread of the CodeRed Worm. References include: * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html * http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20010618.html Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ This is a final notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of all statements in this notice, all of the information has been checked to the best of our ability. Should there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this notice. Distribution ============ This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-cbos-webserver-pub.shtml. In addition to Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients: * cust-security-announceat_private * bugtraqat_private * firewallsat_private * first-teamsat_private (includes CERT/CC) * ciscoat_private * cisco-nspat_private * nanogat_private * incidentsat_private * comp.dcom.sys.cisco * Various internal Cisco mailing lists Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on the Cisco Security Advisories page at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt/, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the URL given above for any updates. Revision History ================ +===========================================================================+ | Revision | 2001-Aug-23 20:00 (UTC -800) | Initial public release | | 1.0 | | | +===========================================================================+ Cisco Product Security Incident Procedures ========================================== Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This notice is Copyright 2001 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including all date and version information. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.2 iQEUAwUBO4Xb9w/VLJ+budTTAQEbjAf3WU93RD81WsnY/5LqzOM1jfQbqMJzsrc4 2dywTIw9xS9d2BIBjeKLUmyKeb983ImnxCn3gSIyWainCM52LfFbakiax8ly0OUs hOiryRaq8HBJchJEb1yaAkIQvQFCufi8yd8cGbXHUB6Wa1wbySKgsx+qXhpgpEtx q5dXAXUUeed0I6mlZijWc3YfUZlfjL8epHl2rdF1/G6WwYnOVqkQrO6mmO7c4r3L Xmvach7vy6wSyG3d+KYBZAryDrOvvvHJAT3FE0uW1NlNsx3YN90mJx7f2Bd9vPOb qKwKcCd2lx9TWs5/ESYYXw2x4rL2+yox16BTws3pYSeasMdzdg4D =AzSn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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