RE: Eudora MUA: Risky practice -> Security domains

From: borjamat_private
Date: Mon Aug 27 2001 - 18:11:48 PDT

  • Next message: Marcin Jackowski: "javascript can write anything to windows98 registry"

    > I'm sorry, maybe I'm missing the point, but what is keeping the 
    user
    > from deleting the file in Explorer, besides the fact that they may
    > execute one of them "by accident"?  Also, isn't this an issue no 
    matter
    > what you're doing?  That you might do something "by accident" that 
    has
    > undesired effects?
    
    	Well, it is a problem with security domains. You can 
    consider that the contents of an email message which you have 
    received from who knows where may not be trusty, but the contents in 
    your hard disk (especially, files forgotten long ago) may not look 
    suspicious to the user, hence he/she may execute them without paying 
    attention to the risks. They are simply "files in the hard disk", 
    not "attachments in a message". -
    
    	When you receive an email message with Eudora, the attached 
    files travel from one security domain to another without user 
    intervention. User intervention is required (for example) to delete 
    them, with the known risks.
    
    	A file should never cross the "border" between two security 
    domains without explicit user intervention. For example, with KMail 
    or Netscape (at least the last versions I used), you have to select 
    the attachment and save (or open) it. If you don't select it, it 
    isn't extracted.
    
    	A MUA and a web browser are security applications. A flaw 
    can lead to a complete system compromise.
    
    	And don't forget something apparently silly, but important: 
    the less code deals with a suspicious attachment, the less 
    probability of using a security bug. If the attachments are 
    automatically extracted whenever a message is received, and there is 
    a security flaw in the extraction code, it will be possible to 
    exploit it even though the user doesn't open the attachment. 
    Designing software with this kind of precautions is a good thing, 
    IMHO.
    
    > I'm sorry, but I have to disagree with you here.  It's a windows
    > feature;  when you double-click an executable, it executes.  If you
    > double-click a JPEG, it brings up the default viewer with the JPEG 
    in
    > it.  How is it the fault of Windows that a careless user might
    > accidentally run an executable?
    
    	Well, when some smart guy felt innovative and decided that 
    Windows should have a lot of different permissions in files, he 
    somehow forgot to add an "execute" permission. This *is* a problem 
    in a system connected to a network. A file extension is information 
    received form the outside, in the message headers. An execute 
    permission is not transmitted through MIME.
    
    	Just think about the situation in Unix: unless you are the 
    superuser, you cannot run a program unless it is marked as 
    executable. It is a protection embedded in the operating system, at 
    the program execution system call.
    
    	And in the command line, if you follow good practice and 
    don't put the current directory in the PATH, you won't execute a 
    file outside of the system directories (or whatever you have in the 
    PATH) by accident, unless you explicitly write the complete path to 
    the program or "./". Is this similar to Windows? ;-)
    
    	Regards,
    
    
    
    
    	Borja.
    



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