Re: Vulnerability in credit union's E-statement feature

From: Hugo van der Kooij (hvdkooijat_private)
Date: Sat Sep 01 2001 - 11:34:23 PDT

  • Next message: Gareth Owen: "Re: verizon wireless website gaping privacy holes"

    On Fri, 31 Aug 2001, BlueJAMC wrote:
    
    > Obviously, the problem here is clear;  the account number is clear text.
    > Of course, the link requires you to include a password.  However,
    > considering the fact that most users the same password for
    > everything--e-mail, e-statements, chatroom SNs, etc--the requirement to
    > use a password is little consolation.  This, coupled with the fact that
    > the individual branches for the credit union do not check for any type
    > of identification other than a signature when making a withdrawl, makes
    > this even more dangerous.
    
    Any bank using plain username/password authentication should be avoided
    at all costs! Such a design is painfully insecure. Any steady
    username/password combination can be obtained and replayed over time.
    It usually only takes a glance on the keyboard of someone typing his/her
    password to get a good hunch. (recognize any name, carbrand, ....?)
    
    I'm not aware of other country's specifications but in the Netherlands all
    banks use some sort of one-time passwords. Most of them use the tokens
    made by Vasco.
    
    The security requires 3 items:
     - challenge generated by the server
     - physical access to the OTP generator. (stack 5 credit cards and you got
    a picture of the size ;-)
     - pincode of the OTP
    These generate a response that is unique and is send back to the server.
    
    Hugo.
    
    -- 
    All email send to me is bound to the rules described on my homepage.
        hvdkooijat_private		http://hvdkooij.xs4all.nl/
    	    Don't meddle in the affairs of sysadmins,
    	    for they are subtle and quick to anger.
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sun Sep 02 2001 - 11:53:33 PDT