Re: File extensions spoofable in MSIE download dialog

From: Georgi Guninski (guninskiat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 26 2001 - 09:22:00 PST

  • Next message: Jonathan G. Lampe: "RE: File extensions spoofable in MSIE download dialog"

    I don't have internet explorer to test but rfc 2616 describes some "security considerations".
    It is a good idea browser vendors check this:
    -------------------------------------------------------- 
    http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec15.html#sec15.5
    [15 Security Considerations]
    15.5 Content-Disposition Issues
    
    RFC 1806 [35], from which the often implemented Content-Disposition (see section 19.5.1) header in HTTP is derived, has a number of very
    serious security considerations. Content-Disposition is not part of the HTTP standard, but since it is widely implemented, we are
    documenting its use and risks for implementors. See RFC 2183 [49] (which updates RFC 1806) for details.
    ---------------------------------------------------------
    
    Georgi Guninski
    http://www.guninski.com
    
    Jouko Pynnonen wrote:
    > 
    > OVERVIEW
    > 
    > A flaw in Microsoft Internet Explorer allows a malicious website to spoof
    > file extensions in the download dialog to make an executable program file
    > look like a text, image, audio, or any other file. If the user chooses to
    > open the file from its current location, the executable program will be
    > run, circumventing Security Warning dialogs, and the attacker could gain
    > control over the user's system.
    > 
    > A piece of HTML can be used to cause a normal download dialog to pop up.
    > The  dialog would prompt the user to choose whether he/she wants to "open
    > this file from its current location" or "save this file to disk". The
    > file  name and extension may be anything the malicious website
    > administrator (or a user having access there) wishes, e.g. README.TXT,
    > index.html, or sample.wav. If the user chooses the first alternative,
    > "open the file from its current location", an .EXE application is
    > actually run without any further dialogs. This happens even if
    > downloading a normal .EXE file from the server causes a Security Warning
    > dialog.
    > 
    > The user has no way of detecting that the file is really an .EXE
    > program and not a text, html, or other harmless file. The program could
    > quietly backdoor or infect the user's system, and then pop up a window
    > which does what the user expected, ie. show a text document or
    > play an audio file.
    > 
    > No active scripting is necessary in order to exploit the flaw. The
    > malicious website can be refered e.g. in an iframe, in a normal link, or
    > by javascript.
    > 
    > DETAILS
    > 
    > The flaw is in the way Internet Explorer processes certain kind of URLs
    > and HTTP headers. No further technical details are disclosed this time,
    > as there is no proper workaround and the vulnerability could be
    > relatively easily and unnoticeably exploited to spread virii, install
    > DDoS zombies or backdoors, format harddisks, and so on.
    > 
    > The flaw has been successfully exploited with Internet Explorer 5.5 and
    > 6. An IE5 with the latest updates shows the spoofed file name and
    > extension without a sign of EXE, and issue no Security Warning dialog
    > after the file download dialog.
    > 
    > Internet Explorer 6 is exploitable in a slightly different way, but the
    > effect is the same. The user gets a download dialog with the spoofed file
    > name and extension, and can choose between "Open" and "Save". Opening the
    > file causes the program to be run.
    > 
    > Older versions such as IE5.0 behave somewhat differently. The dialog
    > indicates the user is about to execute an application; the dialog has the
    > word "execute" instead of "open", and a Security Warning dialog appears
    > after choosing "execute". It still shows the spoofed file name and
    > extension instead of "EXE".
    > 
    > Any way to skip all dialogs, ie. to run an application without ANY
    > dialog with this vulnerability has NOT been found. In all variations of
    > the exploit there is always the normal file download dialog, but the
    > following Security Warning dialog is skipped.
    > 
    > Technical details of the vulnerability will be revealed later.
    > 
    > WORKAROUNDS
    > 
    > Opening a file type previously considered safe, e.g. plain text or HTML
    > file isn't safe with IE. Users of the browser should avoid opening
    > files directly and save them to disk instead (if opening them is
    > necessary at all). If this flaw is being exploited, the file save dialog
    > will reveal that the file is actually an executable program. Dealing with
    > files from an untrusted source isn't advisable anyway. Another workaround
    > is switching to another browser such as Opera or Netscape which don't
    > seem to have this vulnerability.
    > 
    > VENDOR STATUS
    > 
    > Microsoft was contacted on November 19th. The company doesn't currently
    > consider this is a vulnerability; they say that the trust decision should
    > be based on the file source and not type. The origin of the file, ie. the
    > web server's hostname can't be spoofed with this flaw. It's not known
    > whether a patch is going to be produced. Microsoft is currently
    > investigating the issue.
    > 
    > --
    > Jouko Pynnonen          Online Solutions Ltd       Secure your Linux -
    > joukoat_private      http://www.solutions.fi    http://www.secmod.com
    



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