Re: Xitami Webserver stores admin password in clear text.

From: Bernd Luevelsmeyer (bdluevelat_private)
Date: Wed Nov 28 2001 - 20:06:00 PST

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    Larry W. Cashdollar wrote:
    > 
    > I am releasing this a bit early as the vendor has been aware of this issue
    > for a while now.
    [...]
    > The webserver administrator password is stored clear-text in a world
    > readable file.  A local user can use the webserver admin password to gain
    > control of (by default) root owned xitami process.  The server can then be
    > reconfigured by the malicious user (locally unless configured to allow
    > remote administration) to read sensitive system files and execute commands
    > as root.
    [...]
    
    
    On FreeBSD, the Xitami port installs in a way that Xitami has only
    its default configuration and will not run automatically; the user
    has to complete the installation manually. The intention being, of
    course, that he/she will configure the program first, including the
    security matters.
    You are right, however, if that's not done but Xitami is simply
    started, then it is insecure. I'll add a more descriptive warning to
    the port.
    



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