SMC Barricade's dodgy "DMZ" feature

From: Dustin Harriman (Dustin.Harrimanat_private)
Date: Thu Dec 13 2001 - 11:13:19 PST

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    Summary:
    
    I've tested one home firewall appliance (that claims to offer "DMZ"
    functionality) that doesn't offer the security that a (traditionally-
    defined) DMZ should.  In fact, using the feature results in less
    security.
    
    
    Scope: 
    
    This has been tested on an SMC Barricade (SMC7004ABR).  Similar
    products in SMC's product line are probably also affected, as well as
    home firewall appliances made by other manufacturers.
    
    
    Background:
    
    As many of us know, hosts in a DMZ should *not* be able to initiate
    connections to LAN hosts.  The whole point of having a DMZ is to
    prevent LAN hosts from also being compromised, should a DMZ host be
    compromised (from having it's connected-to-from-the-internet services,
    like web or ftp, compromised). But when I set one of my LAN hosts to be
    the "virtual DMZ host" in the Barricade, that host can still connect in
    any usual way (ie. ping, ssh, etc.) to the other LAN hosts.  In other
    words, the "virtual DMZ host" is still part of the LAN, not
    "quarantined" somehow in a little network of it's own.
    
    SMC has offered me a diffrent definition of a DMZ, it basically goes
    like this: when you want to use network software that doesn't use
    standard ports (like ICQ file transfers), it's convenient to be able to
    back off all the firewall rules for a given host, so all ports are
    available.  You'll notice this definition results in less security, not
    more.  According to SMC, this definition is the norm used by virtually
    all other home firewall appliance manufacturers, apparently this makes
    it OK.
    
    I spoke with a customer feedback person at SMC, and explained all this
    to all to him, I've given him a week to respond.  If I can't get SMC to
    change the DMZ functionality to be more secure (with a new firmware
    upgrade), at least I can warn people who were mislead, like myself.
    
    
    Possible solutions:
    
    For those of us stuck with one of these appliances, and want a secure
    DMZ: don't use the DMZ feature on the Barricade, add firewalling rules
    on all LAN boxes to protect them from the DMZ host.  Although
    cumbersome, this should approximate the functionality of a DMZ.  Or get
    a diffrent firewall.
    
    At the very least, SMC should stop using the term "DMZ", a more
    appropriate term would be "LAN Host With No Firewall Rules".  Or maybe
    two new terms like "convenience-DMZ" (as defined by companies like SMC)
    and "security-DMZ" (as defined by the computer security community)
    should be defined.
    
    It would be great if a few home firewall appliances were verified (on
    BugTraq) as having a properly-working DMZ, so those concerned about
    security can make an informed purchase.
    
    
    -- 
    Dustin Harriman     Systems Administrator 
          Analog Design Automation Inc
    



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