Hi Jerome, hi Everyone, > The following text describes a security hole in the encrypted loop > device for Linux. Because of it, an attacker is able to modify the > content of the encrypted device without being detected. This text > proposes to fix the hole by authenticating the device. > > comments are welcome Correct. The encrypted loop device for Linux is vulnerable to the described attack. However, I'd rather prefer, in certain contexts, the use of a digital signature scheme to HMAC, while authenticating especially at mount time and sometimes at cluster time, for the following reasons (in no particular order): 0 digital signature schemes allows administrator(s) of each system to trust or not to trust colleagues, while not sharing the same HMAC secret key; 0 digital signature can be "safely" computed by external well-known crypto hardware (eg. smart cards, coprocessors, etc.); 0 the same technology can be used to produce signature(s) for optical storage, as required by some national directives (eg. such as the Italian one that actually require two signatures and two hash computed with different hash algorithms); 0 the administration pool can choose to not trust anymore the contents of an encrypted device signed with a key-pair owned by an administrator that has been revoked from the pool (eg. an administrator can be fired, etc.); 0 time-stamp tokens [RFC 3161] allows the pool of administrators to continue to trust the contents of an encrypted device signed before the revocation of the signing key-pair; 0 etc. The trade-off between the security and the efficiency offered by a digital signature scheme is in my opinion acceptable especially while using the device for non interactive purposes; I'm thinking to WORM used for archiving data (in this context the authentication token can be computed not only for each file but can come either at cluster time or when the WORM disk get closed). Sincerely, alfonso [RFC 3161] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) - C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3161.txt>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Jan 02 2002 - 21:53:47 PST