LIDS Security Advisory 1

From: Huagang Xie (xieat_private)
Date: Wed Jan 09 2002 - 11:26:48 PST

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    LIDS Advisory 1
    ================
    ------------------------------[BUG #1]-------------------------
    Severity : CRITICAL
    Discovery : Stealth
    Original advisory : 
    http://www.team-teso.net/advisories/teso-advisory-012.txt
    
    Description :
    - -------------
    
    The use of LD_PRELOAD can make a program with privileges given by LIDS
    execute attackers code. This mean that a root intruder can get every
    capability or fs access you configured LIDS to grant. Moreover, if you
    granted CAP_SYS_RAWIO or CAP_SYS_MODULE to a program, an attacker could
    deactivate LIDS and thus, access any file.
    
    In some configurations, this also lead to users being able to become root.
    (there must be a program granted CAP_SETUID which is not setuid)
    
    Systems affected :
    - ------------------
    
    Every LIDS patch whose version is lower or equal to 1.1.0 for 2.4 series
    Every LIDS patch whose version is lower or equal to 0.11.0pre1 for 2.2 
    series
    
    You can find a Little shell script here to see that you are vulnerable :
    http://www.lids.org/download/test-lids.sh
    http://www.lids.org/download/test-lids.sh.asc
    Remember that it's only a silly test that do obvious things and that those
    tests may fail if it is not run in the context I wanted it to be run.
    
    Solution :
    - ----------
    
    For 2.4 users :
    http://www.lids.org/download/lids-1.1.1pre2-2.4.16.tar.gz
    http://www.lids.org/download/lids-1.1.1pre2-2.4.16.tar.gz.asc
    
    For 2.2 users :
    Use the patch against 0.10.1 :
    http://www.lids.org/download/LIDS-security-patch-0.10.1-2.2.20.diff.gz
    http://www.lids.org/download/LIDS-security-patch-0.10.1-2.2.20.diff.gz.asc
    
    0.11.0pre2 version is not vulnerable but it is broken.
    ------------------------------[BUG #2]-------------------------
    Severity : CRITICAL
    Discovery : Phil <pbi@cartel-info.fr>
    
    Description:
    - ------------
    Programs launched before LIDS is sealed keep full CAPS after the sealing.
    We could imagine a shell code that make a daemon from pre-sealing era
    deactivate LIDS using CAP_SYS_RAWIO or CAP_SYS_MODULE.
    
    Systems affected :
    -------------------
    Same as BUG #1
    
    Solution :
    -------------------
    Same as BUG #1
    ------------------------------[BUG #3]-------------------------
    Severity : CRITICAL
    Discovery : Stealth
    
    Description:
    - ------------
    Program in a shell Script which inherit LIDS capability/acls can be 
    redirect to other evil program using PATH, ALIAS etc. That evil program 
    can also gain that capability/acls from its parent -- the shell script.
    
    This bugs is as severity as BUG #1.
    
    Systems affected :
    - ------------------
    Same as BUG #1
    
    Solution :
    - ------------------
    Same as BUG #1
    
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    LIDS TEAM
    Jan-9-2002
    
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