[resend] Avirt Gateway Telnet Vulnerability (and more?)

From: Strumpf Noir Society (vuln-devat_private)
Date: Mon Jan 21 2002 - 06:07:03 PST

  • Next message: Fyodor: "Re: remote memory reading through tcp/icmp"

    Strumpf Noir Society Advisories
    ! Public release !
    <--#
    
    
    -= Avirt Gateway Telnet Vulnerability (and more?) =-
    
    Release date: Friday, January 18, 2002
    
    
    Introduction:
    
    The Utah, USA-based company Avirt specializes in the development
    of (inter-)networking and sharing technologies. As such, it
    maintains the SOHO and Gateway proxy product lines. 
    
    Recently, the SNS research team published two advisories in regards 
    to these products, after which we were informed of at least one other
    buffer overflow vulnerability in Avirt's Gateway product line.
    
    SNS research would like to thank mr R. Hassell for pointing this
    problem out to us.
    
    These products can be found at vendor Avirt's web site:
    http://www.avirt.com
    
    
    Problem:
    
    The Avirt Gateway technology contains, amongst others, a telnet proxy. 
    Due to a failure to check for length of the input served to this proxy,
    a buffer overflow condition exists which could be exploited to execute
    arbitrary code on the target system.
    
    To exploit this flaw an attacker would have to connect to the telnet
    proxy and at the "Ready>" prompt pass it a buffer of >2000 bytes. The
    service will die, EIP is overwritten.
    
    All Avirt's Gateway products run as a NT system service by default.
    
    
    (..)
    
    
    Solution:
    
    Vendor has been notified at the time this message went out. We're sure
    the problem will be added to their "bug list which will be consulted
    when any upgrades are made."
    
    This was tested on a Win2k configuration with both the Avirt Gateway 
    v4.2 as well as the Avirt Gateway Suite v4.2.
    
    Initially our advice for users would be to set tight trusted ip-ranges
    and disable the vulnerable services when possible. In light of this new
    problem however, we have to consider the possibility that boundary
    checking was not a priority during development of these products. Since
    fixing the problems when found doesn't seem to be one for this vendor
    either, our advice is to not use these services until the problems
    have been dealt with.
    
    
    yadayadayada
    
    SNS Research is rfpolicy (http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html) 
    compliant, all information is provided on AS IS basis.
    
    EOF, but Strumpf Noir Society will return!
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Jan 21 2002 - 09:03:56 PST