VirusWall HTTP proxy content scanning circumvention

From: Boris Wesslowski (bw@inside-security.de)
Date: Mon Mar 11 2002 - 04:25:19 PST

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    FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
    
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    Inside Security GmbH Vulnerability Notification
    Revision 0.3  2002-03-10
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    The latest version of this document is available at
    http://www.inside-security.de/vwall_cl0.html
    
    A demo server and proof of concept code are available at
    http://www.inside-security.de/vwall_cl0_poc.html
    
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    Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall HTTP proxy content scanning circumvention
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    Summary:
      Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall contains a HTTP proxy that prevents users
      from downloading virus-infected content by scanning the data received
      from a web server before passing it to the client. However, the default
      configuration of the HTTP proxy will cause it to skip content scanning if
      a malicious web server provides a modified HTTP header, thereby letting
      virus-infected content pass.
    
    Impact:
      Users behind the VirusWall can unintentionally download virus-infected
      content from a malicious web server without being protected by the
      VirusWall.
    
    Affected systems:
      Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall 3.6
    
    Releases tested:
      Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall 3.6 for Red Hat Linux 6.2
    
    Vendor status:
      The vendor was informed 2002/02/25 and replied that a major change in
      the software would be needed to fix this issue and agreed with our
      suggested workaround below adding the server timeout comment.
    
    Detailed description:
      The Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall HTTP proxy contains a configuration
      option called "Skip scanning if Content-length equals 0". This option
      is enabled by default and only mentioned but not explained in the
      administrator's guide. It may be useful to prevent scanning of "empty"
      web pages. If this option is enabled and the proxy receives a document
      from a web server with real content, but which is preceded by a HTTP
      header with content-length field set to 0, it will pass the document
      to the client without scanning it. Of course, the web server must have
      been modified to return a zero content length field when serving a
      virus-infected document. This could e.g. have been done by a malicious
      webmaster or an intruder with the intent to trick users into downloading
      virus-infected content from his/her site. Unfortunately many web
      browsers e.g. Netscape 4.7, Netscape 6 and MSIE 6 will ignore the zero
      content-length field in the HTTP header and still download the document.
    
    Proof of concept:
      A modified server to demonstrate the vulnerability and proof of concept
      source code are available at
    
      http://www.inside-security.de/vwall_cl0_poc.html
    
      The tests are done with the EICAR anti-virus test file, for more
      information about the anti-virus test file visit the European Institute
      for Computer Anti-Virus Research (EICAR) at http://www.eicar.org/
    
    Suggested workaround:
      Disable the "Skip scanning if Content-length equals 0" option in the
      HTTP proxy configuration using the VirusWall web administration
      interface. When disabled certain sites may display slowly, in this
      case the "server timeout" value on the advanced configuration page
      should be configured to a smaller value.
    
    Credits:
      This vulnerability was found and documented by Jochen Thomas Bauer
      <jtb@inside-security.de> and Boris Wesslowski <bw@inside-security.de> of
      Inside Security GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany.
    
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    (C) 2002 Inside Security GmbH
    This notice may be redistributed freely provided that redistributed copies
    are complete and unmodified, and include all date and version information.
    
    ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES,
    INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
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    DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
    
    IN NO EVENT WILL INSIDE SECURITY GMBH BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE,
    PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL,
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    THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE
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