KPMG-2002012: (Re-submitted) Sambar Webserver Serverside Fileparse Bypass

From: Peter Gründl (pgrundlat_private)
Date: Wed Apr 17 2002 - 23:54:52 PDT

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              -=>Sambar Webserver Serverside Fileparse Bypass<=-
                          courtesy of KPMG Denmark
    
    BUG-ID: 2002012
    Released: 17th Apr 2002
    Re-submitted: 18th apr 2002
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    Cause for re-submission:
    ========================
    It would appear that I am in need of glasses. The patch URL in the
    original advisory was misspelled, and this advisory is re-submitted
    to make sure people that are interested in the patch can obtain it.
    
    
    Problem:
    ========
    A flaw in the serverside URL parsing could allow a malicious user to
    bypass serverside fileparsing and display the sourcecode of scripts.
    The same flaw could allow a malicious user to crash the web service.
    
    
    Vulnerable:
    ===========
    - Sambar Webserver V5.1p on Windows 2000
    - Other versions were not tested.
    
    
    Details:
    ========
    It is possible to bypass the serverside parsing of scripts, such as
    .pl, .jsp, .asp, .stm and download the sourcecode. The bypassing also
    opens up for a request to certain DOS-devices that the server would
    then attempt to access. These ressources used in such requests are
    not freed properly and as a result, the web server will eventually
    run out of memory and the operating system will kill the web
    service.
    
    To bypass the serverside parsing, an attacker would have to access
    the ressource with a suffix of <space><null>. There are a lot of
    ways to achieve this in eg. Internet Explorer, and an example of
    sourcecode exposure could be:
    
    http://server/cgi-bin/environ.pl+%00
    
    which would return the following (perl sourcecode):
    
    read(STDIN, $CONTENT, $ENV{'CONTENT_LENGTH'});
    print< GATEWAY_INTERFACE: $ENV{'GATEWAY_INTERFACE'}
    PATH_INFO:  $ENV{'PATH_INFO'}
    PATH_TRANSLATED:  $ENV{'PATH_TRANSLATED'}
    QUERY_STRING:  $ENV{'QUERY_STRING'}
    REMOTE_ADDR:  $ENV{'REMOTE_ADDR'}
    REMOTE_HOST:  $ENV{'REMOTE_HOST'}
    REMOTE_USER:  $ENV{'REMOTE_USER'}
    REQUEST_METHOD:  $ENV{'REQUEST_METHOD'}
    DOCUMENT_NAME:  $ENV{'DOCUMENT_NAME'}
    DOCUMENT_URI:  $ENV{'DOCUMENT_URI'}
    SCRIPT_NAME:  $ENV{'SCRIPT_NAME'}
    SCRIPT_FILENAME:  $ENV{'SCRIPT_FILENAME'}
    SERVER_NAME:  $ENV{'SERVER_NAME'}
    SERVER_PORT:  $ENV{'SERVER_PORT'}
    SERVER_PROTOCOL:  $ENV{'SERVER_PROTOCOL'}
    SERVER_SOFTWARE:  $ENV{'SERVER_SOFTWARE'}
    CONTENT_LENGTH:  $ENV{'CONTENT_LENGTH'}
    CONTENT:  $CONTENT
    END
    
    
    Vendor URL:
    ===========
    You can visit the vendors webpage here: http://www.sambar.com
    
    
    Vendor response:
    ================
    The vendor was contacted 3rd of April, 2002. The vendor confirmed the
    bug on the same day, and notified us that a patch was being developed.
    On the 17th of April, the vendor released a new version that corrects
    the issues.
    
    
    Corrective action:
    ==================
    The vendor has released Version 5.2b, which is available here:
    http://sambar.dnsalias.org/win32-preview.tar.gz
    
    
    Author: Peter Gründl (pgrundlat_private)
    
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    KPMG is not responsible for the misuse of the information we provide
    through our security advisories. These advisories are a service to
    the professional security community. In no event shall KPMG be lia-
    ble for any consequences whatsoever arising out of or in connection
    with the use or spread of this information.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    



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