Fwd: non-disclosed info in Outlook can lead to potential serious Social Attack.

From: Intel Nop (0x90at_private)
Date: Wed Jul 17 2002 - 13:19:18 PDT

  • Next message: skp: "[AP] Oracle Reports Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability"

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1
    
    (can I resubmit this, signed by the key for this email instead of the other 
    key I signed it with, thnx).
    
    See below...
    
    I don't know if this has been discussed on bugtraq before, but I just thought
    it might be important to bring up. Noting Outlook Express specifically, even
    6, is vulnerable to certain Social Attacks and interception/redirection of
    mail rather trivially, caused by non-disclosed header/email information in
    the From: address box. Outlook 2000 and previous versions, all have the same
    problem if viewed specifically from the preview pane only, (I don't know the
    stats on how many view specifically from the preview pane, but at my place of
    employment, it turns out to be plenty). I'm not a Microsoft outlook expert,
    nor have I had the time or effort to go and look for the cure, other than
    recommending to enforce some openPGP or other form of digital signature
    system for the business environment as to identify and confirm who you
    received mail from. This attack is very simple, as someone can easily go get
    a free web-based e-mail account and just know the name of the person they
    intend to masquerade and send the email to the unknowing user to socially
    engineer pertinent and possibly confidential information from the unknowing
    user, as I notice, when hitting reply to user, it still does not disclose the
    email address unless investigated further to the properties of the user name.
    Not to mention, it is also rather trivial to forge email addresses, and still
    contain a reply-address to the masquerading user who initiated the attack as
    well. This is probably widely known, but maybe not taken as seriously as it
    should be, and the use of One-way hash signatures for email authentication
    would be highly recommended in general to the public, as they do have certain
    software freely available that is quite trivial to use and requires little
    knowledge to operate. The possibilities of this attack are endless, and
    combined with a little social engineering, the level of confidential
    information that could be obtained is alarming. We need to have a rfc for
    Digital Trust on the Internet. Any takers to help establish one?
    
    Anyway, my two cents for the day.
    
    0x90
    http://www.invisiblenet.net
    
    
    - - --
    People will do tomorrow what they did today because that is what they
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
    Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
    
    iEYEARECAAYFAj010UsACgkQN6nb5Smw0U2OUQCgwwOLDSdonkFArBEqTYG40uMp
    EKEAoPjv+Sf2oVlo3/RJV6vs3KeGsZpG
    =wzat
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jul 18 2002 - 10:48:52 PDT