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Cisco Security Advisory: Heap Overflow in Solaris cachefs Daemon
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Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2002 July 24 16:00 (UTC +0000)
Contents
Summary
Products Affected
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
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Summary
This advisory describes a vulnerability that affects Cisco products and
applications that are installed on the Solaris operating system, and is
based on the vulnerability of an common service within the Solaris
operating system, not due to a defect of the Cisco product or application.
A vulnerability in the "cachefs" program was discovered that enables an
attacker to execute arbitrary code under Solaris OS. This vulnerability
was publicly announced in the CERT Advisory CA-2002-11. All Cisco products
and applications that are installed on Solaris OS are considered
vulnerable to the underlying operating system vulnerability, unless the
workaround was applied. This vulnerability is described in details in
Sun(sm) Alert Notification at
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F44309 .
No other Cisco product is vulnerable.
Sun is working on a patch. Until the patch is released all affected
customers are advised to apply the workaround described in the workaround
section.
This advisory is available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-cachefs.shtml.
Products Affected
All products that are based on the following Solaris releases are
affected:
* Solaris 2.5.1
* Solaris 2.6
* Solaris 7
* Solaris 8
The following products are affected:
* Media Gateway Controller (MGC) and Related Products
* * Products running on Solaris 2.5.1 are vulnerable unless
CSCOh013.pkg release 1.0(9) or later has been installed. The
product that is based on this version of Solaris is Signaling
Controller 2200 (SC2200).
* * Products running on Solaris 2.6 are vulnerable unless
CSCOh013.pkg release 1.0(9) or later has been installed. Products
running on Solaris 8 are vulnerable unless CSCOh013.pkg release
2.0(2) or later has been installed. The products that are based
on these versions of Solaris are:
* * SC2200
* * Cisco Virtual Switch Controller (VSC3000)
* * Cisco PGW2200 Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
Gateway
* * Cisco Billing and Management Server (BAMS)
* * Cisco Voice Services Provisioning Tool (VSPT)
* * Cisco Element Management Framework (CEMF) and Related Products
All releases of CEMF are vulnerable. The related products are:
* * Cisco 12000 Manager
* * Cisco DSL Manager
* * Element Manager Software for the Cisco 7200 and 7400 Series
Routers
* * Element Manager Software for the Catalyst 6500 Series & Cisco
7600 Series Routers
* * Universal Gateway Manager
* * Cisco Cable Manager
* * Cisco Media Gateway Manager
* * Cisco MGC (Media Gateway Controller) Node Manager
* Cisco IP Manager
All releases.
* Cisco Secure ACS for Unix
All releases.
The following products are not affected:
* BTS10200
* Cisco IDS
No other Cisco products are affected.
Details
This vulnerability is described in the following advisories/notifications:
* Sun Alert Notification at
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F44309 .
* CERT Advisory CA-2002-11 at
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-11.html .
* This issue is also being referenced as CAN-2002-0085 (see
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0085 .
A remotely exploitable heap overflow exists in the cachefsd program. It
is installed by default on the Sun Solaris OS. Cachefsd caches requests
for operations on remote file systems mounted via the use of NFS protocol.
An attacker can send a crafted RPC request to the cachefsd program to
exploit the vulnerability.
According to Sun Microsystems, failed attempts to exploit this
vulnerability may leave a core dump file in the root directory. Note that
the core file may be created by some other process and that its presence
is not a certain sign of a compromise. Additionally, if the file
/etc/cachefstab exists, it may contain entries other than a known cache
directories (e.g., /cachefs/cache0).
Impact
It is possible to execute an arbitrary code on the vulnerable computer.
That can lead to a full OS compromise where an attacker can gain root
privileges.
Software Versions and Fixes
Sun Microsystem is working on a patch. Their latest status on this
vulnerability is available at
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F44309 .
Obtaining Fixed Software
Currently Cisco can not offer fixed software for this vulnerability. Cisco
will patch all affected products after Sun releases patches for Solaris
OS. All affected customers are advised to apply the workaround.
Please do not contact either "psirtat_private" or
"security-alertat_private" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
The workaround is applicable to all Cisco products mentioned in the
advisory. For MGC and related products, if you have applied the script
from CSCO013.pkg you are protected and you do not have to apply this
workaround.
Comment out cachefsd in /etc/inetd.conf as shown below:
* For Solaris 2.6, 7 and 8:
#100235/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd
cachefsd
* Solaris 2.5.1:
#100235/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root
/usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd cachefsd
Once the line is commented out either:
* Reboot, or
* Send a HUP signal to inetd(1M) and kill existing cachefsd processes,
for example, on Solaris 2.5.1 and 2.6 do the following:
$ kill -HUP <PID of inetd>
$ kill <PIDs of any cachefsd processes>
Solaris 7 and 8 do the following:
$ pkill -HUP inetd
$ pkill cachefsd
Exploitation and Public Announcements
According to CERT/CC the exploit program for this vulnerability is
publicly available and there are credible reports that this vulnerability
is actively being exploited.
Status of This Notice: INTERIM
This is an interim security advisory. Cisco anticipates issuing updated
versions of this notice at irregular intervals as there are material
changes in the facts, and will continue to update this notice as
necessary. The reader is warned that this notice may contain inaccurate or
incomplete information. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
all statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco anticipates issuing monthly updates of this
notice until it reaches FINAL status.
A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-cachefs.shtml. In addition to
Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with
the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet
news recipients:
* cust-security-announceat_private
* bugtraqat_private
* first-teamsat_private (includes CERT/CC)
* ciscoat_private
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* firewallsat_private
* Various internal Cisco mailing lists
Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide
Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
URL given above for any updates.
Revision History
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2002-July-24 16:00 UTC+0000 | Initial public |
| | | release |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide
Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices.
All Cisco Security Advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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This notice is Copyright 2002 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and
include all date and version information.
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