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Title: Cumulative Patch for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 2
(Q316333)
Date: 24 July 2002
Software: Microsoft SQL Server 2000, Microsoft Desktop Engine
(MSDE) 2000
Impact: Two vulnerabilities, both of which could enable an
attacker to run code on the server.
Max Risk: Moderate
Bulletin: MS02-038
Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-038.asp.
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Issue:
======
This patch eliminates two newly discovered vulnerabilities affecting
SQL Server 2000 and MSDE 2000:
- A buffer overrun vulnerability that occurs in several Database
Consistency Checkers (DBCCs) that ship as part of SQL Server 2000.
DBCCs are command console utilities that allow maintenance and
other operations to be performed on a SQL Server. While many of
these are executable only by sysadmin, some are executable by
members of the db_owner and db_ddladmin roles as well. In the most
serious case, exploiting this vulnerability would enable an
attacker to run code in the context of the SQL Server service,
thereby giving the attacker complete control over all databases
on the server.
- A SQL injection vulnerability that occurs in two stored
procedures used in database replication. One of these can only be
run by users who have been assigned the db_owner role; the other,
due to a permissions error, could be run by any user who could log
onto the server interactively. Exploiting the vulnerability could
enable an attacker to run operating system commands on the server,
but is subject to significant mitigating factors as discussed
below.
Mitigating Factors:
====================
Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in Database Consistency Checkers:
- Both the db_owner and db_ddladmin roles carry with them
significant privileges, and only should be granted to trusted
users.
- This allows the user to escalate privileges to the level of the
service account. And this escalation would be minimal if best
practices were followed and SQL were installed as a normal domain
account.
SQL Injection Vulnerability in Replication Stored Procedures:
- Exploiting the vulnerability would, at a minimum, require that
the attacker have the ability to log onto the server
interactively. However, best practices strongly militate against
giving such permissions to untrusted users.
- Simply being able to run the affected stored procedures would not
enable an attacker to exploit the vulnerability. As discussed in
the FAQ, the vulnerability could only be exploited if the
administrator had previously enabled the SQL Server Agent Proxy
account. By default, this account is disabled.
- Even when enabled, the SQL Server Agent Proxy account has by
default only the privileges associated with a domain user. If
administrators follow best practices, it is likely that any user
who could exploit the vulnerability would already have this level
of privilege.
Risk Rating:
============
- Internet systems: Moderate
- Intranet systems: Moderate
- Client systems: None
Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
Security Bulletin at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-038.asp
for information on obtaining this patch.
Acknowledgment:
===============
- Cesar Cerrudo
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