WHERE'S THE CA$H: Internet Explorer 6.00. Outlook Express 6.00

From: http-equivat_private
Date: Sat Jul 27 2002 - 12:03:53 PDT

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    Saturday, July 27, 2002
    
    Trivial lead-up to yet another silent delivery and installation of an 
    executable on the target computer using Outlook Express 6. This can 
    be achieved combining several past possibilities, specifically the 
    following:
    
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1033
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2456
    
    and here:
    
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4387 
    
    And:
    
    XML. In order to achieve the required results as outlined in the 
    above, we must determine the location of the Temporary Internet File 
    [TIF] folders.  This can only be achieved if we can physically open 
    up our file from within and read its location. Technically that can 
    only be achieved if we have a security dialogue prompt asking us for 
    permission. For security reasons all embedded and attached files are 
    transferred to the TIF upon opening the mail message. If we elect to 
    open the file through acceptance of the security warning dialogue, it 
    is opened from within the TIF by whatever program is associated with 
    that file.
    
    Okay:
    
    Okay. XML. XML files are associated with Internet Explorer. It 
    utilises an XML parser to parse the file for display in Internet 
    Explorer. These files are peculiar little files that require an 
    additional file called a style sheet [*.xsl] in order to process 
    scripting and html. To do that, the file must be 'linked' to the XML 
    file like so:
    
     <?xml version="1.0"?> 
    <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="malware.xsl" ?> 
    
    where malware.xsl can contain our scripting and html.
    
    And:
    
    Well, for security purposes linking to a remote *.xsl fle is 
    denied: "permission denied", so instead we force our scripting and 
    html  into the XML file and into the XML parser directly:
    
    <?xml version="1.0" ?>
    <?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" 
    href="http://www.malware.com/malware.css" ?>
    <malware>
    
    <h4 style="position: absolute;top:39;left:expression(alert
    (document.location));font-family:arial;font-size:12pt;BACKGROUND-
    IMAGE:url('http://www.malware.com/youlickit.gif');background-
    repeat:no-repeat;background-position: 100 30;z-index:-
    100;height:200pt;width:400pt;font-family:Verdana;color:red">sure it 
    can, malware says so</h4>
    </malware>
    
    What this does is generate an error in the XML parser along with our 
    html and scripting, and as a consequence, having the file opened up 
    from within the TIF by Internet Explorer, we are once again able to 
    determine our TIF location. Couple that with the aforementioned past 
    possibilities and we are once again in business.
    
    Working Example:
    
    [nothing but text]
    
    http://www.malware.com/cannotindeed.zip
    
    
    [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/x-ma.png 17KB]
    
    Important Notes:
    
    1.On several test machines, recollection is foggy as to default 
    status of *.xml in mail. Possibility is that 'confirm open after 
    download' is not default.
    2. On several test occasions, scripting was fired in mail and 
    remotely on the web site despite 'active scripting off' both, however 
    not reproducible consistentantly and may be related to processor 
    speed and xml parser delay in parsing combination.
    3. Test series of win98 machines, Internet Explorer 6.0.2600 and 
    Outlook Express 6.0.2600 bandages and all
    4. None.
    
    End Call
    
    -- 
    http://www.malware.com
    



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