HylaFAX - Various Vulnerabilities Fixed

From: Lee Howard (faxguyat_private)
Date: Mon Jul 29 2002 - 10:02:06 PDT

  • Next message: VanDyke Technical Support: "Re: Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability in VanDyke SecureCRT 3.4 & 4.0 beta"

    HylaFAX.org Security Advisory
    17 June 2002
    
    Subject: Various Vulnerabilities Fixed
    
    
    Introduction:
    
    HylaFAX is a mature (est. 1991) enterprise-class open-source software
    package for sending and receiving facsimiles as well as for sending
    alpha-numeric pages.  It runs on a wide variety of UNIX-like platforms
    including Linux, BSD (including Mac OS X), SunOS and Solaris, SCO, IRIX,
    AIX, and HP-UX.  See http://www.hylafax.org
    
    HylaFAX.org has hosted, distributed, and directed HylaFAX software
    development since 1997.
    
    iFax Solutions is the commercial support arm of HylaFAX.org and provides
    single-incident or annual support contracts as well as other commercial
    support options.  See http://www.hylafax.org/support.html
    
    
    Problem Description and Impact:
    
    iFax Solutions recently discovered that HylaFAX faxgetty in versions prior
    to 4.1.3 does not check the TSI string which is received from the remote
    facsimile system before it uses it in logging and elsewhere.  However,
    reception protocol limits the length of the TSI string to twenty
    characters.  Consequently, a remote sender with a specially-formatted TSI
    string can cause faxgetty to segmentation fault, and although it is
    unlikely that this could be used to execute arbitrary commands, it does 
    expose an easily exploitable denial of service vulnerability.
    
    Development discussion to eliminate this vulnerability is available at:
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=300
    
    Christer Oberg reported on Bugtraq in September 2001 that HylaFAX faxrm
    and faxalter had format strings vulnerabilities (see
    http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/215984).
    HylaFAX development found this vulnerability to be applicable to all
    executables in versions prior to 4.1.3 which accept the "-h host" option
    because the mentioned user input was not checked before sending an error
    message to standard error/output.  These binaries include faxalter, faxrm,
    faxstat, sendfax, sendpage, and faxwatch.  In distributions such as
    FreeBSD which independently made any of these binaries set-uid (not the
    HylaFAX default), an attacker could use these vulnerabilites to gain
    elevated system privileges.
    
    Development discussion to eliminate these vulnerabilities is available at:
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=202
    
    CAN-2001-1034 was assigned to this vulnerability.  See 
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3357 for details.
    
    In recent testing, Lee Howard discovered that faxgetty would segfault due 
    to a buffer overflow after receiving a very large line of image data.  
    Potentially, this vulnerability could allow an attacker to maliciously 
    craft an exploiting faxsend mechanism to call a vulnerable host, 
    conceivably using the buffer overflow to execute arbitrary commands on the 
    host system.  Since on most installations faxgetty is run as root, such an 
    exploitation would allow the abuse of root permissions.  This 
    vulnerability could more easily be abused for denial of service purposes.
    
    Development discussion to eliminate this vulnerability is available at:
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=312
    
    Status:
    
    HylaFAX development has corrected all of the vulnerabilities described
    here as well as provided numerous other bugfixes and enhancements in its
    recent 4.1.3 patchlevel code release.  All users are strongly encouraged
    to upgrade.  See http://www.hylafax.org/download.html to obtain 4.1.3
    source code.
    
    For users who are somehow unable to upgrade, HylaFAX CVS-based patches are
    available for these vulnerabilities individually at
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=290&action=view, 
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=300&action=view, and 
    http://bugs.hylafax.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=318&action=view
    respectively.
    
    There are no known exploits for any of the described vulnerabilities
    beyond what is stated above.
    
    
    Thanks:
    
    Special thanks goes to iFax Solutions and Christer Oberg for pointing out
    these vulnerabilities to HylaFAX development.  Many thanks also go to
    Vyacheslav Frolov and Patrice Fournier for their development work in
    providing these patches.
    
    --
    Lee Howard
    HylaFAX Support Engineer
    iFax Solutions, Inc.
    lee.howardat_private
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Jul 29 2002 - 11:01:01 PDT