Re: trojan horse in recent openssh (version 3.4 portable 1)

From: Jim Breton (jamesb-bugtraqat_private)
Date: Thu Aug 01 2002 - 11:45:34 PDT

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    On Thu, Aug 01, 2002 at 02:17:36PM +0200, Christian Bahls wrote:
    > 1.) i do not often check signatures an packets i install
    
    Particularly difficult when there _are no_ signatures available for the
    package you want to install (in this case, the non-"portable" tarballs).
    
    AFAIK there have never been signatures available for the OpenBSD
    tarballs.  At least none that I've seen on the FTP server.  I hope this
    will change soon...?
    
    I have also been curious as to how exactly DJM and the portability group
    have been verifying that _they_ obtained clean tarballs before applying
    their modifications.  If they also have no way to verify tarballs, that
    effectively blinds a very important set of eyes from being able to spot
    trojans.
    
    (Of course, if they are just doing CVS checkouts from a secure CVS
    server, this issue would be moot.  But the fact that the portable
    versions were also trojaned, combined with the appearance that the
    trojaning occurred _on the FTP server and not on any development
    machines_, I think allows one to reasonably assume that the tarballs are
    being used.  This last point may not be the case, we will have to wait
    for more information to come out.)
    



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