Security Advisory: Raptor Firewall Weak ISN Vulnerability

From: Kristof Philipsen (kristof.philipsenat_private)
Date: Fri Aug 02 2002 - 05:10:30 PDT

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    +==================================================================+
    | Ubizen Security Advisory: Raptor Firewall Weak ISN Vulnerability |
    +==================================================================+
    | kristof.philipsenat_private		    Friday August 02, 2002 |
    +==================================================================+
    
    
    AFFECTED SYSTEMS
    
    Raptor Firewall 6.5 (Windows NT)
    Raptor Firewall V6.5.3 (Solaris)
    Symantec Enterprise Firewall 6.5.2 (Windows 2000 and NT)
    Symantec Enterprise Firewall V7.0 (Solaris)
    Symantec Enterprise Firewall 7.0 (Windows 2000 and NT)
    VelociRaptor Model 500/700/1000
    VelociRaptor Model 1100/1200/1300
    Symantec Gateway Security 5110/5200/5300 
    
    
    BRIEF DESCRIPTION
    
    Raptor Firewall is Symantec's implementation of a firewalling/proxy
    application. A problem exists within the IP stack implementation of
    Raptor Firewall during  the  generation  of  the  Initial  Sequence 
    Numbers ("ISNs").   The algorithm used for generating these ISNs is
    not sufficiently random and could allow a remote attacker to hijack
    any connection to or traversing the Raptor Firewall. 
    
    
    DETAILED DESCRIPTION
    
    During the transport and forwarding of packets,    Initial Sequence
    Numbers ("ISNs") are generated by the Raptor Firewall's IP stack. A
    weakness in the generation of  these  ISNs  could  allow  a  remote 
    attacker to easily  predict  the  sequence  numbers  for a  certain 
    session.
    
    The generation of the ISNs is based on two factors:  the source and 
    destination port, and the source and destination IP.   For a single
    connection,      there is an initial sequence number which will not 
    change for a certain [long] amount of time.   An example connection
    ("session") can be described as follows:
    
     session = {[src ip:src port] [dst ip:dst port]}
    
    An ISN is attributed to a specific sessions for a certain amount of
    time.  Below are some excerpts of real-life tests performed against
    a Raptor Firewall, demonstrating this vulnerability.  The following
    tests  sends  SYN packets  from  a source address  [x.x.x.x]  on  a 
    source-port  [1700]  to   a   destination  address  [z.z.z.z] on  a 
    destination port [80] over a period of several minutes. 
    
    
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Timeline      Connection                      ISN             Delta 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
    10:33:05      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      -
    10:33:06      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    10:33:07      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    ...
    10:35:30      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    10:35:31      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    10:35:32      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    ...
    10:50:43      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    10:50:44      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    10:50:45      x.x.x.x:1700 -> z.z.z.z:80      2088144436      0
    
    
    As shown above,   this test clearly shows that the Initial Sequence
    Number does not change for a significant amount of time.    Another
    test showed that when an ISN is assigned to a session, this session
    and ISN are stored for future use for a  certain  amount  of  time, 
    regardless whether or not several new sessions are established from
    the same source IP.
    
    This issue has been reproduced against  6  Raptor  Firewalls,  each
    belonging to different administrative bodies. 
    
    
    CHARACTERISTICS
    
    * The ISN for each session is different,   but for a single session 
      the ISN doesn't change for a considerable amount of time.
    
    * This  could  possibly  allow  an attacker to  hijack the session.
    
    * This issue affects all vulnerabilities handled  by the  Raptor IP
      stack, including  all  sessions  to  and  traversing  the  Raptor
      Firewall.
    
    
    SEVERITY
    
    This vulnerability can  allow  a  remote  attacker  to  potentially 
    hijack an existing connection to or traversing the Raptor Firewall.
    
    Classification: medium to high
    
    
    VENDOR STATUS
    
    Symantec's Security Response Team (symsecurityat_private) was 
    contacted  about  this  issue  on  Wednesday,  July  03  2002. A 
    coordinated effort between Symantec and Ubizen has lead to quick
    resolution of this issue.    HotFixes are available to eradicate 
    this vulnerability.
    
    
    SOLUTION
    
    Symantec has released HotFixes to resolve this issue.   They can
    be found at the following locations:
    
    Technical Bulletin:
       http://www.symantec.com/techsupp/bulletin/archive/firewall/082002firewall.html
    
    Patches and HotFixes: 
       http://www.symantec.com/techsupp/
    
    
    -- 
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kristof Philipsen                   Security Engineer
    Ubizen Luxembourg                   http://www.ubizen.com
    Tel: +352 26 31 05 85               Fax: +352 26 31 05 86
    --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    



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