FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:35.ffs

From: FreeBSD Security Advisories (security-advisoriesat_private)
Date: Mon Aug 05 2002 - 16:47:17 PDT

  • Next message: Kanatoko: "Re: [SNS Advisory No.55] Eudora 5.x for Windows Buffer Overflow Vulnerability"

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    
    =============================================================================
    FreeBSD-SA-02:35.ffs                                        Security Advisory
                                                              The FreeBSD Project
    
    Topic:          local users may read and write arbitrary blocks on
                    an FFS filesystem
    
    Category:       core
    Module:         kernel
    Announced:      2002-08-05
    Credits:        Matt Dillon <dillonat_private>,
                    Ian Dowse <iedowseat_private>,
                    Tor Egge <teggeat_private>
    Affects:        All releases of FreeBSD up to and including 4.6.1-RELEASE-p4
                    4.6-STABLE prior to the correction date
    Corrected:      2002-06-23 22:34:52 UTC (RELENG_4)
                    2002-07-31 17:55:22 UTC (RELENG_4_6)
                    2002-07-31 17:55:11 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
                    2002-07-31 17:54:57 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
    FreeBSD only:   YES
    
    I.   Background
    
    The Berkeley Fast File System (FFS) is the default filesystem used by
    FreeBSD.
    
    II.  Problem Description
    
    A bug in the calculation of the maximum permitted FFS file size
    allows users to create files that are larger than FreeBSD's virtual
    memory system can handle. The integer overflows that result when such
    files are accessed may map filesystem metadata into the user file,
    permitting access to arbitrary filesystem blocks.
    
    The bug is encountered only on FFS filesystems with a block size of
    16k or greater on the i386 architecture, or 32k or greater on the
    alpha architecture.  Also, the filesystem must have at least 6 blocks
    of free space, and the user must have write access to at least one
    file in the filesystem.
    
    The default FreeBSD FFS filesystem block size was changed from 8k to
    16k on all architectures just before 4.5-RELEASE.
    
    III. Impact
    
    Local attackers may cause a denial of service by simply corrupting the
    filesystem.  A local attacker may also be able to read and write
    arbitrary files on local filesystems, allowing them to gain superuser
    privileges.
    
    FFS filesystems with a block size less than 16k (on the i386
    architecture) or 32k (on the alpha architecture), such as those
    created using the default FFS filesystem block size prior to
    4.5-RELEASE, are not vulnerable.
    
    The following command can be used to determine the block size
    used on a given filesystem:
    
      # dumpfs /some/filesystem | grep '^bsize'
    
    IV.  Workaround
    
    On filesystems with 16k blocks, the bug cannot be exploited when a
    process has a file size resource limit (RLIMIT_FSIZE) of 63 MB or
    less.  This can be most easily accomplished by modifying
    /etc/login.conf so that the appropriate login classes (typically
    `default') contain a field entry such as the following:
    
            :filesize=63m:\
    
    After editing /etc/login.conf, the corresponding capability database
    must be rebuilt with the following command:
    
       # cap_mkdb /etc/login.conf
    
    Please see login.conf(5) for details.  Note that this will not affect
    currently running processes, nor new processes started by users who
    are already logged in.
    
    The corresponding limit appropriate for filesystems with 32k or larger
    blocks is not known at this time, and might be smaller or larger than
    63 MB.
    
    It is the responsibility of applications such as `login' and `sshd' to
    read and honor login.conf.  Be aware that 3rd party applications that
    provide login functionality may or may not honor login.conf.
    
    V.   Solution
    
    1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.6-STABLE; or to any of the
    RELENG_4_6 (4.6.1-RELEASE-p5), RELENG_4_5 (4.5-RELEASE-p14), or
    RELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p21) security branches dated after the
    respective correction dates.
    
    2) To patch your present system:
    
    a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
    detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.  The following patch
    has been tested to apply to all FreeBSD 4.x releases.
    
    # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:35/ffs.patch
    # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:35/ffs.patch.asc
    
    b) Recompile your kernel as described in
    http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the
    system.
    
    VI.  Correction details
    
    The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
    corrected in FreeBSD.
    
    Path                                                             Revision
      Branch
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vfsops.c
      RELENG_4                                                     1.117.2.10
      RELENG_4_6                                                1.117.2.9.2.1
      RELENG_4_5                                                1.117.2.7.2.1
      RELENG_4_4                                                1.117.2.3.2.1
    sys/conf/newvers.sh
      RELENG_4_6                                               1.44.2.23.2.10
      RELENG_4_5                                               1.44.2.20.2.15
      RELENG_4_4                                               1.44.2.17.2.20
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (FreeBSD)
    
    iQCVAwUBPU8ML1UuHi5z0oilAQGkWQP/fJvzkrl2ptG87Qn2pIa24kLyax5WCnca
    uPhq9JxIhXIxAqdIZcrEbbTyeRo/ygtsLzxDKOP0G+A2VxilVL9Ld3a32OSM+nzM
    uiSnVHTIxPtmkyZnwdmyTcrBki290p/W3LnZhxzfAt1vdIRD+ibOkBXNAaXFxDRz
    T1UzIarVqgM=
    =wq5s
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Aug 06 2002 - 11:48:57 PDT