[Full-Disclosure] Remote detection of vulnerable OpenSSL versions

From: Florian Weimer (Weimerat_private-Stuttgart.DE)
Date: Tue Sep 17 2002 - 09:39:39 PDT

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    Remote detection of vulnerable OpenSSL versions
    
       RUS-CERT has developed a tool to remotely detect vulnerable OpenSSL
       implementations.
    
    Why is such a tool required?
    
       While the "Slapper" worm is spreading, many system administrators ask
       themselves whether their systems are vulnerable. Even if you apply
       vendor patches regularly, there are some risks which are hard to deal
       with:
    
         * Vendors might use OpenSSL to implement SSL services, but do not
           publicize it. Consequently, administrators might not know that
           they need to update.
         * Human error might leave systems vulnerable (e.g. people forget to
           restart services after applying patches, or are distracted by
           phone calls and miss a machine).
         * Other SSL implementations might have similar bugs.
         * Vendor upgrades often do not alter the version number, and their
           is no easy way to check if a patched version is running.
         * Vendor patches sometimes do not eliminate the vulnerability.
    
       As a result, full disclosure is essential; it makes independent
       regression testing possible.
    
    How does it work?
    
       It is difficult to tell OpenSSL 0.9.6e from vulnerable versions
       because the OpenSSL developers chose to terminate the process if a
       buffer overflow attempt is detected. Over the network, a crash due to
       a buffer overflow and an abrupt, but deliberate process termination
       look the same: in both cases, the TCP connection breaks down. At first
       glance, it appears that we are out of luck and cannot detect
       vulnerable versions.
    
       However, if we overrun the buffer by only a few bytes, the vulnerable
       version (without check) does not crash. This way, we can tell 0.9.6e
       from previous, vulnerable versions:
    
                                 small overflow large overflow
                      pre-0.9.6e    no crash        crash
                          0.9.6e     crash          crash
                          0.9.6g     error          error
    
       (0.9.6g signals an SSL error over the network, as one would expect.)
    
       Other combinations are possible, of course, and this program tries to
       flag them in a reasonable way. (We consider malformed responses an
       indication of lack of care, and a potential security problem.)
    
       This program performs a third connection attempt (actually the first
       one), to test compatibility of the the SSL implementations.
    
    Obtaining and running the tool
    
       You can download a copy of the C source code here:
    
    <http://CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE/advisories/openssl-sslv2-master/openssl-sslv2-master.c>
    
       Compiling this program requires an OpenSSL development environment
       (including header files). You have to link this program with OpenSSL's
       "crypto" library (using "-lcrypto", not "-lcrypt"). On some systems,
       you have to link with "-ldl", too.
    
       After compilation, you can run this program using:
    
    $ ./openssl-sslv2-master [-s] host-IP [port]
    
       Then a test is performed against host-IP (an IP address in dotted-quad
       notation) and the TCP service running on port (a decimal number). port
       can be omitted, then the default port 443 is assumed.
    
       Note: You can use this program to test any SSL Version 2.0 server, not
       just HTTPS servers. For some services, a STARTTLS message is required
       to initiate the SSL handshake (e.g. SMTP, POP3, IMAP). This message is
       sent if you supply the "-s" option.
    
    Risks and limitations
    
       The server could crash (when the large buffer overflow is attempted),
       and fail to restart automatically. The program detects this, but
       obviously cannot undo any damage.
    
       If the server which is being tested does not support SSLv2, it often
       reacts in a strange way. The SSL protocol does not define a clear
       rejection message, so no proper diagnosis is return by the tool in
       such cases. To determine the cause of a handshake failure, you should
       use a full SSL/TLS implementation, such as "openssl s_client".
    
    Credits
    
       This program was inspired by the source code of the "Slapper" worm.
    
       Thanks to Helmut Springer for testing and spotting a few bugs.
    
    About RUS-CERT
    
       RUS-CERT <http://CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE/> is the Computer Emergency
       Response Team located at the Computing Center (RUS) of the
       University of Stuttgart, Germany.
    
    URL of the current version of this document:
    
       <http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/advisories/openssl-sslv2-master.php>
    
    -- 
    Florian Weimer 	                  Weimerat_private-Stuttgart.DE
    University of Stuttgart           http://CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE/people/fw/
    RUS-CERT                          fax +49-711-685-5898
    _______________________________________________
    Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
    Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
    



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