Re: The Art of Unspoofing

From: Euan (euan_briggsat_private)
Date: Thu Sep 19 2002 - 09:12:20 PDT

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    This is just simplistic, ill conceived rubbish. There is absolutely no
    way to guarantee that you are "tracking down" the correct IP or the
    correct person. How can you possibly rely on the TTL to distinguish the
    address of the "attacker" among thousands of DNS requests? The TTL can
    be forged on spoofed packets - and they may come from a completely
    different source than the attacker itself... Is it safe to assume an
    attacker is going to use the generic public smurf.c tool etc, is it safe
    to assume the attacker is going to use traceroute or ping to test if the
    victim host is alive? Is it safe to assume the attacker wont use blind
    spoofed IP ID techniques or some other method to test if the victim host
    is alive? No.
    
     At the beginning of your post you mention "the raw interface to the
    networking.." - yet you simply ignore or do not realise that the
    flexibility and multitude of ways to use and abuse tcp/ip makes this
    whole "art of unspoofing" nothing but presumptious rubbish that will
    waste peoples time and help them catch none but the most ignorant and
    useless of attackers. (People this stupid are unlikely to be a danger to
    your network in the first place). Whats to stop an attacker spoofing dns
    lookups and pings from another host in order to incriminate it?
    
    What it comes down to is - it is  easy  for a semi-intelligent attacker
    to cause a denial of service attack that is completely untraceable from
    the target side, grasping at straws like this wont do much good atall
    except waste a lot of your time.
    
    Euan
    
    eric.princeat_private wrote:
    
    > I found this on a site today, thought it might be of some intrest:
    >
    > The Art of Unspoofing
    >
    



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