Re: The Trivial Cisco IP Phones Compromise

From: Peter Peters (P.G.M.Petersat_private)
Date: Fri Sep 20 2002 - 07:53:00 PDT

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    On Thu, 19 Sep 2002 16:32:43 -0400, you wrote:
    
    >1.  Access to the Cisco 7960 IP phone:
    >
    >    A Cisco model 7960 IP phone running a SIP-compatible image has a
    >    password that can be set by the IP phone administrator.  The default
    >    password is "cisco" if the password has not been set to some other
    >    value.  Cisco strongly recommends setting the password to something
    >    other than the default.
    
    There have been discussion going on (and off) about the danger of
    default passwords. How long does it take before so-called secure aware
    companies become really aware of security issues?
    
    >    The key sequence of "**#" is not intended as a password.  It is
    >    clearly and publicly documented in many places within Cisco's
    >    product literature.  The key sequence is solely intended to protect
    >    against casual or accidental changes to the phone's configuration.
    
    Then just don't accept is as a password. It's that simple, isn't it?
    
    >2.  Abuse of the TFTP service:
    >
    >    Although the author is correct that various attacks against the TFTP
    >    service can be mounted, there are several measures that can be
    >    employed by the IP phone administrator and the organization to
    >    mitigate the risk. 
    >
    >    If the network is firewalled properly so that the different network
    >    segments are compartmentalized as the Cisco SAFE white papers
    >    recommend, then the TFTP server will only respond to legitimate
    >    requests.  The TFTP server does not need to reside on the same
    >    network segment as the IP phone.  If RFC 1918 addressing is employed
    >    for the IP phones and proper ingress/egress filtering is in place as
    >    recommended, then any such attack is highly unlikely to succeed from
    >    outside the enterprise VoIP network, even with the use of UDP.
    >    Access to the physical networks from within the enterprise may make
    >    it easier to succeed with the attack, but if the VLANs are properly
    >    protected and MAC addresses monitored per the SAFE documents -- for
    >    example, by using arpwatch or arpsnmp -- then an attack may be
    >    detected by the IP phone administrators. 
    
    Not in all situations the IP phones are within one network. Sometimes
    the phones are used by home workers. And not all ADSL- and
    cable-companies allow IPsec over their network. At least not when you
    have a consumer version of the connection. If you want IPsec you have to
    buy the expensive business version for all the home workers.
    



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