Re: Ambiguities in TCP/IP - firewall bypassing

From: Lyndon Nerenberg (lyndonat_private)
Date: Sun Oct 20 2002 - 12:03:25 PDT

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    >Think of ECN; should older stacks simply reject a packet with Syn+0x42
    >because they don't know what 0x42 is?
    >
    >If I've understood correctly, you were suggesting to drop "bad" packets.
    >I agree; only let established traffic through your firewall, and only
    >let packets with Syn or Syn+Ack set and with Fin and Rst unset establish
    >state in the firewall. Ignore the rest of the flags.
    >
    >Of course, if anyone finds this un-interoperable, please chime in!
    
    Before people get too paranoid about accepting packets I recommend
    they read RFC 3360: Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered Harmful.
    
       1.  Introduction
       
          TCP uses the RST (Reset) bit in the TCP header to reset a TCP
          connection.  Resets are appropriately sent in response to a
          connection request to a nonexistent connection, for example.  The TCP
          receiver of the reset aborts the TCP connection, and notifies the
          application [RFC793, RFC1122, Ste94].
       
          Unfortunately, a number of firewalls and load-balancers in the
          current Internet send a reset in response to a TCP SYN packet that
          use flags from the Reserved field in the TCP header.  Section 3 below
          discusses the specific example of firewalls that send resets in
          response to TCP SYN packets from ECN-capable hosts.
    
          [ ... ]
    
    --lyndon
    



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