Re: Cisco PIX SSH/telnet dDOS vulnerability CSCdy51810

From: Sharad Ahlawat (sahlawatat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 11 2002 - 09:52:28 PST

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    This email is in response to the BugTraq posting at 
    http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/299046
    
    There are two issues in the original email which are addressed below.
    
    1) The TCP stack on the PIX is non RFC compliant in responding to TCP packets 
    destined to the network broadcast address. 
    
    One could craft a telnet/ssh client to connect to the PIX by sending requests 
    to the network broadcast address of the subnet the PIX is connected to. Even 
    if one was able to connect to the PIX, by using such a crafted client, one 
    would still need an account/password to gain access to the PIX.
    
    Security of the PIX is not compromised.
    
    A router does not allow directed broadcasts by default so such behavior can 
    only be experienced on the local subnet. If directed broadcast is required 
    for a subnet then using the ACL option of the directed broadcast command on 
    the router, TCP directed broadcasts can be filtered out for the subnet.
    
    This nonconformant behavior is being fixed in all upcoming PIX releases by 
    allowing new TCP sessions to be created only if the packet was sent to the 
    PIX interface address. Packets sent to the broadcast or subnet address would 
    be dropped.
    
    2) PIX releases unused memory and will allocate memory using a best fit scheme 
    which will reuse freed chunks of memory. When allocating memory, the PIX will 
    first attempt to re-use memory that was freed and not part of the contiguous 
    heap.
      
    Cisco has performed additional testing and confirms that no fragmentation or 
    memory leaks are seen based on the attack described in this report.
    
    - -- 
    Sharad Ahlawat
    Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
    http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
    Phone:+1 (408) 527-6087
    PGP-key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xC12A996C
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