FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:41.smrsh

From: FreeBSD Security Advisories (security-advisoriesat_private)
Date: Tue Nov 12 2002 - 20:06:53 PST

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    FreeBSD-SA-02:41.smrsh                                      Security Advisory
                                                              The FreeBSD Project
    
    Topic:          smrsh restrictions can be bypassed
    
    Category:       core
    Module:         contrib_sendmail
    Announced:      2002-11-12
    Credits:        zen-parse <zen-parseat_private>,
                    Pedram Amini <paminiat_private>,
                    iDEFENSE <URL:http://www.idefense.com/>
    Affects:        All releases prior to FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE
    Corrected:      2002-10-08 00:53:31 UTC (RELENG_4)
                    2002-10-08 00:57:20 UTC (RELENG_4_7)
                    2002-10-26 21:11:30 UTC (RELENG_4_6)
                    2002-10-26 21:10:59 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
                    2002-10-26 21:10:22 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
                    2002-10-26 21:08:42 UTC (RELENG_4_3)
    FreeBSD only:   NO
    
    I.   Background
    
    The sendmail Restricted Shell command (smrsh) is intended as a
    replacement for the system shell (/bin/sh) for use by sendmail.  It
    limits the set of programs that can be executed through sendmail to
    those in a single directory, and limits shell built-in commands.
    
    II.  Problem Description
    
    Errors in smrsh's handling of command arguments with "||" or spaces
    may allow the execution of commands outside of those in its target
    directory.  Since command arguments may be specified in local users'
    `.forward' files, the smrsh restrictions may be bypassed using such
    files that are specially crafted.
    
    III. Impact
    
    Users with a local account and the ability to create or modify their
    `.forward' files can circumvent the smrsh restrictions.  This is
    mostly of consequence to systems which have local users that are not
    normally allowed access to a login shell, as such users may abuse this
    bug in order to execute arbitrary commands with normal privileges.
    
    IV.  Workaround
    
    There is no known workaround, short of disabling `.forward' files.  To
    do so, add the following line to the sendmail.mc file, regenerate the
    sendmail.cf configuration file, and restart sendmail.
    
       define(`confFORWARD_PATH', `')dnl
    
    V.   Solution
    
    1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.7-STABLE; or to the RELENG_4_7,
    RELENG_4_6, RELENG_4_5, RELENG_4_4, or RELENG_4_3 security branch
    dated after the correction date.
    
    2) To patch your present system:
    
    The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.4, FreeBSD
    4.5, and FreeBSD 4.6 systems.
    
    a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
    detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
    
    # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:41/smrsh.patch
    # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:41/smrsh.patch.asc
    
    b) Execute the following commands as root:
    
    # cd /usr/src
    # patch < /path/to/patch
    # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/sendmail
    # make depend && make && make install
    
    VI.  Correction details
    
    The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
    corrected in FreeBSD.
    
    Path                                                             Revision
      Branch
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    src/contrib/sendmail/smrsh/smrsh.c
      RELENG_4                                                        1.3.6.9
      RELENG_4_7                                                  1.3.6.8.2.1
      RELENG_4_6                                                  1.3.6.6.2.1
      RELENG_4_5                                                  1.3.6.5.4.1
      RELENG_4_4                                                  1.3.6.5.2.1
      RELENG_4_3                                                  1.3.6.4.2.1
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    VII. References
    
    <URL:http://www.idefense.com/advisory/10.01.02.txt>
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