WebIntelligence session hijacking vulnerability

From: Dirk Van Droogenbroeck (dirk.vandroogenbroeckat_private)
Date: Thu Jan 09 2003 - 08:47:35 PST

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    Ubizen Security Intelligence Lab Security Advisory SIL/03/001
    
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    Product: WebIntelligence(r)
    Tested version: 2.7.1
    Advisory date: Jan 09, 2003
    Vulnerability type: session hijacking leading to remote unauthorized
    access
    Severity: High
    
    ----------------------------------------
    
    1) Brief description
    
    The WebIntelligence application is a web interface towards the Business
    Objects application server. It uses HTTPS and cookies to keep track of
    user sessions. These session cookies are vulnerable. An attacker can
    guess session cookies and use this information to hijack sessions of
    other users, thereby gaining unauthorized access to the WebIntelligence
    tool. Next, the attacker can take any action the original user is able
    to take, except changing the account password.
    
    There also exists a win32 client application that uses the same
    protocols and the same cookie mechanism to connect to the Business
    Objects server.
    
    Both web interface and client are vulnerable to session hijacking.
    
    2) Affected versions
    
    WebIntelligence 2.x products
    
    3) Details
    
    "WebIntelligence is the one tool that allows users to access, analyze,
    and share strategic data over intranets and extranets for both
    traditional relational databases and online analytical processing (OLAP)
    servers."
                ( http://www.businessobjects.com/products/webi/ )
    
    The WebIntelligence server assigns a cookie to each session for purpose
    of session tracking. Whenever a user connects using his/her browser,
    he/she receives such a session ID cookie. If the user then authenticates
    successfully, the WebIntelligence server marks this session at server
    side as 'authenticated'.
    
    During the same session, the user's browser keeps sending this cookie
    back to the server. This helps the server to keep track of the user's
    session. As long as the session is marked 'authenticated' the server
    will not prompt the user for his/her password anymore.
    
    So, if an attacker succeeds in stealing or guessing a user's session ID
    cookie, the attacker may gain access to this user's WebIntelligence
    session.  It has been found that WebIntelligence uses cookies that can
    be guessed by an attacker.
    
    As a result, the attacker can view any screen, including mail box, and
    perform any action the user can. The attacker can not set a new password
    for the hijacked account as this would require knowledge of the current
    password.
    
    4) Extension
    
    The Business Objects full client is a Windows application that can be
    downloaded through the WebIntelligence interface. Although it does not
    run in a browser, it does use the same HTTPS protocols for connecting to
    the WebIntelligence server and the same session ID cookies are used.
    Therefore, ZABO is also vulnerable to this attack.
    
    The client only product (BusinessObjects) is not at risk.
    
    5) Solution
    
    Business Objects ( http://www.businessobjects.com ) has a hotfix for
    this issue (Bug ID 1063161) and it is expected that this fix will be
    incorporated in Service Pack 7, expected in the early part of Q2.
    
    Business Objects advises their customers to deploy the appropriate CSP
    on all their servers machines. The appropriate CSPs for SP3, SP4, SP5
    and SP6 can be downloaded from:
    http://techsupport.businessobjects.com/app/SecBulletin_120402.asp .
    
    6) Timeline (only relevant steps)
    
    November 2002: Ubizen contacted and provided details to Business Objects
    
    December 2002: Received bug ID and preliminary fix info from Business
    Objects
    January 2003: Business Objects released security bulletin and fixes to
    its customers
    
    7) Credits
    
    This vulnerability was discovered by Stijn Durant of Ubizen (
    http://www.ubizen.com ).
    
    8) Disclaimer
    
    All information, advice and statements are provided "AS IS", without any
    warranty of any kind, express or implied, including but not limited to,
    warranties of accuracy, timeliness, non-infringement or fitness for a
    particular purpose. Ubizen assumes no liability for any loss or damage
    whatsoever (direct, indirect, consequential or otherwise). The use of
    and/or reliance on any of the information, advice or statements provided
    will be at the sole risk of the using/relying party.
    
    Copyright (c) 2003 by Ubizen N.V. All rights reserved. Ubizen, SIL and
    Security Intelligence Lab are trademarks or registered trademarks of
    Ubizen N.V. All other trademarks or registered trademarks are the
    property of their respective owners.
    



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