RE: Observation on randomization/rebiasing...

From: Michael Wojcik (Michael.Wojcikat_private)
Date: Thu Feb 06 2003 - 00:43:29 PST

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    > From: Jason Coombs [mailto:jasoncat_private]
    > Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2003 5:08 PM
    
    > A properly security-hardened binary DOES NOT require support 
    > for arbitrary relocations, arbitrary dynamic library injection,
    > arbitrary code injection resulting in new execute paths defined at
    > run-time, and the type of programmability required by software
    > developers. Once code has been compiled and linked, even when that
    > code makes use of dynamic libraries, there is no longer any unknown.
    
    There are plenty of examples of programs and libraries that by design load
    and execute independently-developed code: browser plugins, ISAPI, and so
    forth.  Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether this is a Good
    Thing, or whether it fits someone's definition of "a properly
    security-hardened binary", it's certainly a popular approach.  The security
    community has not to date had much luck convincing users and programmers to
    adopt even its uncontroversial recommendations; I doubt you'll get any
    traction with this one.
    
    Michael Wojcik
    Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus
    



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