Field Notice - IOS Accepts ICMP Redirects in Non-default Configuration Settings

From: Damir Rajnovic (gausat_private)
Date: Tue Feb 11 2003 - 01:09:04 PST

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    Field Notice - IOS Accepts ICMP Redirects in Non-default
                   Configuration Settings
    
     Field Notice Number 23074 
     Publish Date        2003-February-10
     Author              Damir Rajnovic <gausat_private>
    
    
    Products Affected
    
            Product                         Comments
         ------------------------------------------------------------------
          All Cisco IOS    This issue is not specific to any Cisco IOS 
          software         release or device configuration. The device is 
                           only vulnerable if IP routing is disabled. The 
                           IP routing is enabled by default and it must be 
                           explicitly disabled if required.  
    
    
    Problem Description
    
         If a router has IP routing disabled it will accept bogus ICMP 
         redirect packets and modify its routing table accordingly. With 
         IP routing disabled, the router will act as a Host and it will 
         comply with the Host Requirements given in the RFC1122. If IP 
         routing is enabled(which it is by default) ICMP redirect packets 
         are received and recognized but ignored. The router will not update 
         its routing table with the information present in the redirect 
         packets.   
    
    Background
    
         This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by Ofir Arkin while at 
         @stake (currently The Sys-Security Group, ofir@sys-security.com).   
    
    Problem Symptoms
    
         By sending bogus ICMP redirect packets a malicious user can either
         disrupt or intercept communication from a router. 
    
         The disruption can be accomplished by advertising that a default 
         gateway is an unused IP address from the local subnet. That will
         effectively prevent the router from sending any packets to any 
         destination that is outside the local subnet. 
    
         Another possibility is to advertise a gateway that is on the 
         completely different subnet. If there is a device that will proxy 
         ARP request for this bogus gateway, all victim's traffic destined 
         outside of the local subnet may be forwarded to the bogus gateway, 
         which would cause the victim's traffic to leak out of the local 
         subnet to a device of attacker's choosing. If there is no device 
         that will proxy ARP requests for a bogus gateway then the scenario
         collapses to the first scenario where traffic is simply blocked. 
    
         The last possibility is that malicious user inserts a default 
         gateway whose IP address is the address of the attacker's machine 
         itself. That way a malicious user will be able to receive all 
         victim's traffic host that is destined outside of the local subnet.
         That traffic can subsequently be recorded or manipulated at the 
         attackers' will. The traffic can even be forwarded to the correct 
         gateway so that the victim will be unable to notice what is going 
         on. That a malicious user could participate as a default gateway 
         and intercept and record legitimate traffic is normal operation, 
         and is based on availability principles, and is not dependent on 
         the vulnerability of accepting llegitimate ICMP messages.   
    
    Workaround/Solution
    
         The workaround is to prevent the router from acting upon ICMP 
         redirect packets. This can be accomplished in the following manner:
    
         Router(config)#no ip icmp redirect
    
         The preferred way would be to upgrade to the fixed IOS release. 
         The first fixed releases are:
    
         12.2(13.03)B
         12.2(12.05)T
         12.2(12.05)S
         12.2(12.05)
         12.2(12.02)S
         12.2(12.02)T
    
         These releases are fixed as of the time this notice was written. 
         For the most current list of the fixed releases consult the DDTS
         CSCdx92043.
    
    DDTS
    
             DDTS                           Description
          CSCdx92043                  IOS accepts wrong ICMP redirects
    
    For More Information 
    
    
         Registered users (http://www.cisco.com/register) can view the 
         DDTS details.
         
    
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    ==============
    Damir Rajnovic <psirtat_private>, PSIRT Incident Manager, Cisco Systems
    <http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt>      Telephone: +44 7715 546 033
    200 Longwater Avenue, Green Park, Reading, Berkshire RG2 6GB, GB
    ==============
    There are no insolvable problems. 
    The question is can you accept the solution? 
    



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